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Abstract 
There has been much talk about regulatory reform around the world in the wake of 
the financial crisis but relatively little action. As a major international financial 
centre, the UK is very much at the heart of the debate and has a particular interest in 
the ultimate outcome. The financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of ‘light 
touch’ regulation and ‘principles-based’ regulation, which characterised the UK 
system in the pre-crisis phase. Changes to the institutional structure of regulation 
recently announced by the new coalition government, combined with changes to 
regulatory style, are likely to have far-reaching consequences for the practice and 
intensity of regulation in the UK. This article reviews and assesses recent and pro-
posed regulatory changes and considers the relationship between corporate 
governance and regulation. It evaluates the impact on the UK system of initiatives 
undertaken at international and EC levels as well as various interests and incentives 
within the UK that are likely to be influential in shaping the regulatory regime in 
years to come. 
Keywords: financial regulation, regulatory reform, financial crisis, corporate gov-
ernance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Almost two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the debate about how to 
respond to the global financial crisis continues. While there is no shortage of propos-
als, relatively little has been agreed and implemented either at the international, 
regional or national level. The UK is no exception and the recent change of govern-
ment has created further uncertainty as to the trajectory of reform at the national 
level. Several local considerations make the UK an interesting case study of the 
dynamics of financial regulatory reform at this time. One is the tradition of ‘light 
touch regulation’ that was adopted with political approval during the past decade but 
now faces an evolutionary crisis in the face of criticism at home and abroad. While 
the rhetoric of government and regulators has already shifted, it is open to question 
whether regulatory practices can move quite so quickly. Another consideration is the 
disproportionately large scale of the financial sector (both domestic and interna-
tional) in the UK by comparison with many other countries. The reliance on financial 
services inevitably imposes political constraints on the extent to which tighter regula-
tion leading to contraction and job losses can be countenanced. Also relevant is the 
UK government’s position as a shareholder or guarantor of companies controlling a 
large part of the UK’s banking assets. This brings into focus a different perspective 
from the government’s traditional focus on legislation and regulation. As an owner, 
the government has profit objectives that may run counter to its regulatory objectives 
and also faces the challenge of acting as an effective owner at a time when institu-
tional investors stand accused of ignoring their monitoring and broader fiduciary 
obligations during the financial bubble that preceded the crisis. 
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The paper begins by considering the causes of the crisis and the mechanisms of 
regulatory accountability. Both are important for an understanding of the framing of 
the reform agenda in the UK and further afield, since reform proposals do not re-
spond to some objective analysis of what went wrong, rather they are the outcome of 
a contested process of identification of causal factors, itself linked with concepts of 
responsibility and accountability for what went wrong. The paper then goes on to 
consider proposed reforms to the institutional structure of regulation and to style of 
regulation, both of which have attracted criticism over their role in the crisis. The 
paper then shifts its focus to regulatory rules, beginning with the delimitation of the 
regulatory perimeter, which has been widely viewed as too narrowly drawn at a time 
of significant innovation and expansion in financial techniques. Proposals for 
strengthening capital requirements are then considered in the light of developments 
at the international and EC level. Attention is then focused on market transparency 
and integrity, which have been linked with the fall in investor confidence that be-
came apparent during the crisis. The role of conduct of business regulation and the 
regulatory response in the crisis is then examined. The substantive part concludes 
with an analysis of how weak corporate governance was implicated in the crisis and 
of reforms that are currently underway. The objective is to provide a high-level 
account of regulatory reform across the board in the UK, analysing how the system 
as a whole is changing and not just its individual components. 
2. CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The causes of the financial crisis are now well known even if their relative signifi-
cance and ranking vary as between different regulators and commentators.1 The lack 
of consensus over causes reflects two factors. First, it is widely recognised that the 
interplay of different causes of the crisis makes it difficult to attribute causality in 
any precise way to different factors. For national systems of regulation the problem 
is even more severe since it is very difficult to isolate national from international 
influences in a globalised marketplace. Second, since diagnosis of causes will inevi-
tably carry implications for the nature and intensity of the regulatory response, it is 
inevitable that any attempt at diagnosis will be contested by political, regulatory and 
market-based groups who see their interests as threatened by emerging reform pro-
                                                                                                                                               
1 For diagnosis of the causes of the crisis, see, e.g., President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, Policy Statement on Financial Markets Developments (March 2008), at: <http://www. 
ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf>; FSA Financial Risk 
Outlook 2009 (February 2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/corporate/Outlook/ 
fro_2009.shtml>; and the Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the 
de Larosière Report, February 2009), at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_ 
larosiere_report_en.pdf>. All these official reports attribute a secondary role to regulatory failure, 
pointing instead to macroeconomic factors and financial market practices as the primary causes. 
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posals. In that sense, the dynamics of regulatory reform cast a shadow over the 
diagnosis of causes. 
The inherent difficulty in attributing causal influence is well illustrated by the ini-
tial question of the respective causal roles of broad macroeconomic factors by 
comparison with regulatory deficiencies. This issue is significant since it carries 
direct implications for the degree to which regulatory reform is necessary, the form it 
should take and what it can achieve. While regulatory deficiencies have attracted 
most attention, loose monetary policy has been identified as a causal factor in the 
creation of an asset bubble in the United States before the onset of the financial 
crisis.2 Moreover, while deficiencies in regulation are a common theme in the many 
national and international diagnoses of the causes of the financial crisis, that concept 
is in itself not simple. In many instances, references to regulatory deficiencies or 
weaknesses conflate a number of issues that should be considered separately if the 
diagnosis of causal influences is to make a meaningful contribution to regulatory 
reform. A distinction between the significance of the institutional structure of regula-
tion on the one hand and the operation of the substantive rules on the other is 
generally recognised but further important distinctions need to be drawn within the 
substantive rules. First, a clear distinction should be made, especially in a system 
such as the UK one where the regulator enjoys such broad powers and discretion, 
between formal grant of powers and the capacity or willingness to use them.3 In the 
context of banking supervision, for example, it has been argued that there are real 
systemic dangers in giving supervisors discretionary powers to set regulatory capital 
for individual institutions since they are unlikely to exercise their powers at points 
when it is most needed.4 Second, a distinction needs to be drawn between substantive 
regulatory rules and the style of regulation that is employed in any system. Regula-
tory style can be said to be a function of the discretion given to the regulator in 
structuring and operating the substantive rules. In the UK system,5 the regulator has a 
relatively free hand in selecting and balancing the regulatory techniques through 
which the objectives of regulation are to be pursued and in determining the intensity 
of regulation by reference to the enforcement of the rules. In that sense, the formal 
                                                                                                                                               
2 M. Miller, P Weller and Lei Zhang, ‘Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analysing the 
Greenspan Put’, 112 The Economic Journal (2002) pp. C171-C186. For evidence that this policy 
continued to bolster asset prices right up to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, see OECD 
Working Paper No 597, Monetary Policy, Market Excesses and Financial Turmoil (March, 2008). 
3 For a comparable observation in the US context, see E. Spitzer, former New York Attorney 
General, commenting that ‘Regulators don’t need additional power, they just need to use their 
existing power appropriately’, Boston Review (March/April 2010), at: <http://bostonreview.net/ 
BR35.2/spitzer.php>. 
4 M. Brunnermeier, A. Crockett, C. Goodhart, A. Persaud and H. Shin, The Fundamental 
Principles of Financial Regulation (Geneva Report on the World Economy), at: <http://www.cepr. 
org/Pubs/BOOKS/Geneva/Geneva.asp>. 
5 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the Financial Services Act 
2010. 
Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 487
legal structure of regulation can be of much less significance than the manner in 
which regulation is practised. In the UK context, the concepts of ‘light touch’ regula-
tion, ‘risk-based’ regulation’ and ‘principles-based’ regulation, none of which are 
referred to in the legislative framework, were the most distinctive features of regula-
tory practice prior to the crisis. 
The role of regulatory deficiencies as a primary cause of the crisis now seems 
well established in the UK, even if there was some initial reluctance on the part of 
the FSA to accept that analysis.6 From the perspective of ranking of causes, the 
Turner Review.7 and the FSA Regulatory Response.8 focused in particular on defi-
ciencies in the regulatory capital regime and the failure (over an extended period of 
time) to match the rapid growth in credit with adequate capital buffers. A related 
factor was a failure to ensure adequate liquidity in individual banks and across the 
system, especially given the fundamental change in the nature of the funding of bank 
lending that resulted from reliance on securitisation and wholesale money markets. 
To the extent that these were failures that were common across many countries and 
can ultimately be traced back (at least in their basic form) to the Basel regime, they 
were relatively easy for the regulator to accept. The Turner Review and FSA Regula-
tory Response paid much less attention to the fact that the FSA as banking supervisor 
failed to use its powers to require higher levels of capital and liquidity as credit 
expanded in individual institutions and across the system, although this factor did 
draw adverse comment in the Treasury Select Committee scrutiny of the failure of 
Northern Rock.9 However, changes in regulatory style now evident in the UK are an 
implicit recognition of the errors of the past and may well prove to be just as impor-
tant as formal changes in institutional structure and regulatory rules. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 See FSA, Financial Risk Outlook 2009 (February 2009), citing the following as causal 
influences: a property price boom; increasing leverage in the banking and shadow banking system; 
rapid expansion of credit and falling credit standards; increasing complexity of the securitised 
credit model; and underestimation of bank and market liquidity risk. A similar trend was evident in 
the United States as none of the five causes of the financial crisis cited by the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets referred expressly to regulatory failure: see E. Pan, ‘Four Challenges 
to Financial Regulatory Reform’, at: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1521504>. 
7 FSA, The Turner Review, A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 
2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Corporate/turner/index.shtml>. The review was 
commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in October 2008 in terms that requested the 
Chairman of the FSA (Lord Turner) to review the causes of the crisis and make recommendations 
for change in regulation and supervision of banks. 
8 FSA Discussion Paper 09/2, A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (hereafter 
FSA Regulatory Response) (March 2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_02. 
pdf>. This review formed part of the FSA’s standard consultation process on regulatory rule-
making, albeit that it was much broader in scope than is normally the case. 
9 See chapter 3 (The Regulation of Northern Rock) in Volume 1 of House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock HC 56-1 (Fifth Report of Session 2007-08). 
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3. REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM 
Accountability is linked with reform in the sense that both the mechanisms of ac-
countability and the process of ‘accounting’ by regulators for their role in the crisis 
are likely to influence the framing of the reform agenda. This influence arises across 
a range of issues that are typically the focus of investigations that follow crises: the 
powers of regulators; their willingness to use their powers and the way they do in 
fact use them; and constraints (formal or otherwise) that may be imposed on the use 
of their powers. While these matters emerge from the operation of the mechanisms of 
accountability, it is inevitable that in many instances they will overlap with causes of 
the crisis as some causes may have been averted or limited in their effect had effec-
tive regulatory action been taken in time. In that sense, the accountability perspective 
provides a concept of regulatory deficiency in terms of what could have been done 
that was not done, rather than the broader concept of regulatory deficiency as any 
aspect of the system that is sub-optimal, such as gaps in the scope of regulation or a 
lack of powers available to the regulator.10 
Accountability regimes have been categorised as falling into three main catego-
ries: legal, administrative and political.11 Legal accountability is quite limited in the 
UK regulatory framework as each of the Tripartite Authorities.12 enjoys a degree of 
legal immunity: the FSA enjoys immunity in respect of the exercise of its functions;13 
the Bank of England has immunity in relation to its new statutory role in the mainte-
nance of financial stability;14 and, while actions of the Treasury may in principle be 
subject to judicial review,15 the statutory and other powers available to government 
provide a solid legal basis for the intervention that has been undertaken during the 
financial crisis.16 Thus, it is not surprising that legal accountability mechanisms have 
not played a significant role in holding the regulatory authorities to account for their 
role in the crisis. Administrative accountability regimes focus on accountability 
within organisations and have been described as ‘managerial rather than legal, 
continuous rather than episodic’.17 There is certainly evidence that this process has 
                                                                                                                                               
10  Of course, to the extent that a regulator (such as the FSA) has very broad discretion, the 
difference between what might have been done and what could have been done becomes more 
problematic but it does nevertheless still exist: for example, primary legislation would be required 
to extend the regulatory perimeter. 
11  See J. Mashaw, ‘Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar 
of Governance’, at: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=924879>. 
12  See section 4 below for further discussion of the institutional structure of regulation in the UK. 
13  Section 1 and Sch 1, Part IV FSMA 2000. 
14  Banking Act 2009, s. 244. 
15  Judicial review is a process by which the courts can review the legality of acts of public 
authorities. See, generally, Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No. 3) [2003] 2 AC 1. 
16  In particular, the UK government has a prerogative power to enter into contracts, thus 
providing a legal basis for the ‘bailouts’ agreed with individual banks during the crisis. 
17  Mashaw, supra n. 11, at p. 121. 
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been in operation within the FSA and the Bank of England, mainly in the form of 
departures of some senior figures,18 but the internal nature of the process makes it 
difficult to assess its full extent. On the other hand, political accountability mecha-
nisms are generally more open to observation. In the UK system of financial 
regulation, the main mechanisms are ministerial powers of appointment, require-
ments to report to Parliament and public scrutiny before a Parliamentary committee. 
Powers of appointment can be viewed as an accountability mechanism (at least so far 
as re-appointment is concerned) and are important both in relation to the Bank of 
England and the FSA: in the former case, the Governor, two Deputy Governors and 9 
members of the Court of Directors are all government appointees;19 in the latter case, 
the Chairman and Board of Directors are all government appointees.20 The annual 
reports of both the Bank of England and the FSA must be laid before Parliament and 
both bodies are open to (and have been subject to) scrutiny by the Treasury Select 
Committee. Of these political mechanisms the most critical has without doubt been 
the Treasury Select Committee, whose reports have often been withering in their 
criticism of the regulatory authorities and the boards of financial institutions.21 
However, the powers of appointment probably carry more significant implications in 
the long term, especially in a model of regulation such as that in the UK where the 
regulatory authorities enjoy broad powers, and therefore the style of regulation may 
be as important as formal legal powers. 
The manner in which the regulatory authorities have accounted for their role in 
the crisis also carries implications for regulatory reform. Dubnick has identified three 
different modes of account giving which focus on the role of the account giver.22 In 
‘reporting’ mode, the account giver is obliged to provide information to the principal 
in a pre-determined manner and primarily seeks compliance with that requirement. 
This mode corresponds with routine forms of reporting (such as annual reports) but 
does not focus on responding to specific developments such as a crisis. By way of 
contrast, in the case of ‘mitigated account giving’ the form of ‘accounting’ is influ-
enced significantly by the account giver, who is expected to respond to an implicitly 
or explicitly awkward situation. This mode corresponds to the scrutiny of the finan-
cial crisis by the Treasury Select Committee, in which the Tripartite Authorities have 
been required to explain their part in its origins and development. In ‘reframed 
account giving’ the account giver is engaged in an effort to control or transform his 
relationship with the account taker. This corresponds with many elements of the 
                                                                                                                                               
18  See, e.g., ‘Bank of England Deputy Governor Falls on His Sword’, Independent, 19 June 
2008; and ‘Bruised Sants’ Departure Is Another Blow to the FSA’, Financial Times, 9 February 
2010. 
19  Under the Bank of England Act 1998 (as amended by the Banking Act 2009). 
20  Under the FSMA 2000. 
21  See, e.g., The Run on the Rock, supra n. 9. 
22  See M. Dubnick, ‘Accountability and the Promise of Performance’, 28 Public Performance 
& Management Review (2005) pp. 376-417. 
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accounting offered by the Tripartite Authorities following the financial crisis in the 
form of detailed reviews,23 which focus to a substantial extent on the influence of 
external factors (such as the role of unregulated ‘shadow banks’ and inappropriate 
use of largely unregulated credit rating agencies) and the need for change in the 
regulatory structure and rules rather than their own failings in terms of competence 
or willingness to use existing powers. Thus, it should be borne in mind that ‘re-
framed account giving’ has the capacity to push the regulatory reform agenda to 
overemphasise the need for regulatory reform, to overstate its capacity to generate 
real change in regulatory practice and perhaps even to focus it on areas where it is 
not most needed. Precisely how that process will influence regulatory reform is 
difficult to predict since the dynamics of regulatory reform are complex, encompass-
ing high-level political direction (at national, EC and international level), the style of 
regulation adopted by the regulator and the variable capacity of market discipline to 
perform a restraining role at different points in the economic cycle. At this point in 
time, there is a clear impression that reform has focused on relatively ‘soft’ targets 
that have not been strongly resisted because they are aligned with the interests of 
regulated entities: the reforms to the scope of regulation and to regulatory capital, 
discussed below, certainly seem to fall into that category. A fuller assessment must, 
however, await the outcome of international initiatives that may introduce more far-
reaching reforms. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
As has been the case elsewhere, the financial crisis has prompted a review of the 
institutional structure of regulation in the UK. While there is no clear evidence from 
around the world that different institutional structures of regulation were better able 
to avert, limit or manage the crisis,24 there has been concern in the UK that collabora-
tion between the Bank of England and the FSA has been problematic.25 According to 
the informal arrangement establishing the Tripartite Authorities in 1997,26 the Treas-
ury was responsible for general policy and the overall structure of regulation; the 
                                                                                                                                               
23  In particular, The Turner Review, supra n. 7; FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8; FSA, 
The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned Review (March 2008); HM Treasury, 
Reforming Financial Markets (CM 7667) (July 2009). 
24  See, e.g., FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at p. 195 (graphing changes in banks’ 
market values over 2007/08 against different regulatory structures), and J. Cooper, ‘The Regulatory 
Cycle: From Boom to Bust’, chapter 28 in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien, eds., The Future of Financial 
Regulation (Hart 2010). 
25  See The Run on the Rock, supra n. 9, at para. 284. 
26  The arrangement was established through a memorandum of understanding, which was 
revised in 2006, see: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_hmt_boe.pdf>. 
Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 491
Bank for financial stability;27 and the FSA for prudential supervision. At least in the 
early phase of the crisis it was clear that there was considerable divergence between 
the FSA and the Bank of England over the extent to which the Bank should provide 
support to failing financial institutions as well as to the broader money market. 
Moreover, it was argued that even when the Bank did move (under government 
pressure) to a more interventionist stance, its capability was limited by its lack of 
ready access to detailed information about individual institutions, which was held by 
the FSA as the prudential supervisor.28 
The creation of the Council for Financial Stability in 2009, while couched in the 
rhetoric of the potential for more effective collaboration among the Tripartite Au-
thorities, did not fundamentally alter their roles or interaction since their individual 
functions remained the same (albeit that both the FSA and the Bank of England now 
have financial stability as explicit statutory objectives).29 The quality and effective-
ness of their interaction and collaboration is unlikely to be altered much by a change 
of name, although one would expect that the experience of the financial crisis would 
itself act as a catalyst for better collaboration. Nor does the failure to provide a 
formal statutory basis for the Council bode well for the future.30 However, significant 
changes in regulatory practice, such as a move to macro-prudential regulation (dis-
cussed below) would require better collaboration than has been evident to date and 
might well be the catalyst for such a development. 
The change of government in the UK following the May 2010 election and 
changes proposed in the EC regulatory framework may well carry greater implica-
tions for the UK in the longer term. While in opposition, the Conservative Party in 
the UK made clear that it would transfer responsibility for banking supervision back 
to the Bank of England.31 and transform the rump of the FSA into a consumer watch-
dog focused on conduct of business regulation.32 It did not take long for the new 
coalition government to convert its plans into action as an announcement in the 
                                                                                                                                               
27  Note that this is separate from the monetary policy function of the Bank, in respect of which 
it enjoys independence from government under the Banking Act 1998. As became clear during the 
financial crisis, the Bank is largely the agent of the Treasury for the purposes of crisis management. 
28  See The Run on the Rock, supra n. 9, at para. 276, concluding that the Tripartite system did 
not operate effectively in dealing with the collapse of Northern Rock. 
29  See the Terms of Reference of the Council for Financial Stability, at: <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/fin_council_financial_stability.htm>. 
30  Although the Treasury website refers to the Council being provided for in statute by the 
Financial Services Act 2010, the relevant clauses were removed from the Bill to ensure that it was 
passed into law before the end of the Parliamentary session. The Conservative opposition (now in 
government) opposed the creation of the Council on the basis that it did not address fundamental 
defects in the current institutional structure: see Hansard (House of Lords), 8 April 2010, column 
1663. 
31  It was transferred to the FSA from the Bank by the Bank of England Act 1998. 
32  See ‘Tories Pledge Rapid Reform on Regulation’, Financial Times, 23 February 2010. 
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middle of June 2010 set out the proposals in more detail.33 The most significant 
development is that the FSA will be disbanded, with the UK moving away from an 
integrated regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model in which prudential regulation (set up as 
a subsidiary of the Bank of England) will be separated from conduct of business 
regulation (to be undertaken by a new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority). 
A new Financial Policy Committee will effectively replace the Tripartite system as 
well as the Council for Financial Stability: its focus will be on financial stability and 
macroeconomic regulation and it will be granted the formal statutory basis that the 
Council for Financial Stability lacked. While the new system does bear some resem-
blance to a ‘twin peaks’ model, some characteristics of the UK system will remain 
distinctive: regulation will operate on an integrated basis across the banking, securi-
ties and insurance sectors; and prudential regulation will be located within the central 
bank, albeit as a separate legal entity. It remains to be seen how some of the prob-
lematic issues, such as the delimitation of prudential and conduct matters, as well as 
the expansion of the role of the Bank of England will work out in practice. What 
does seem clear at this stage is that there will be considerable regulatory upheaval in 
terms of both organisational structure and the relevant rulebooks. 
At the EC level, the Commission has proposed the creation of a European Sys-
temic Risk Council (ESRC) and a European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS).34 While the ESRC is envisaged as having a monitoring and advisory role, the 
ESFS should have the power to make binding technical standards and interpretative 
guidelines to be followed by national authorities in making decisions in connection 
with individual institutions. The characterisation of the ESFS as an interventionist 
agency and a potential rival to national authorities is emphasised by the proposal that 
the ESFS should have ‘the means to ensure coherent application of Community 
legislation’ and to initiate enforcement by the Commission against national authori-
ties which are in breach of Community law.35 It is therefore possible to envisage that 
once the ESRC and ESFS are in place, there will be much more European engage-
ment in the practice of regulation (as opposed to rule-making) than there has been to 
date. It remains to be seen just what effect this will have, although in principle it 
seems likely to dilute the capacity of national regulators to develop and operate 
distinctive styles of regulation. 
                                                                                                                                               
33  See HM Treasury, Statement to the House of Commons by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, Mark Hoban MP, on Reforming the Institutional Framework for Financial Regulation, 
at: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement_fst_170610.htm>. 
34  See Communication from the Commission, ‘European Financial Supervision’, COM (2009) 
252 final. 
35  Ibid., at p. 10. 
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5. REGULATORY STYLE AND OBJECTIVES 
Although the regulatory framework in the UK sets explicit objectives for regula-
tion,36 two features of the system open up the potential for the regulator to influence 
the style of regulation ‘in action’. The first is that the FSA is granted very broad 
powers in respect of rule-making,37 encompassing both the nature of the rules and 
their substantive content. It is this feature which has enabled the FSA to develop its 
distinctive ‘principles-based’ approach to regulation as a response to the perceived 
limitations of a more rules-based system. Second, the division of responsibility 
between the Tripartite Authorities means that the nature of their collaboration, both 
on routine matters and in crisis situations, carries important implications for the 
success or otherwise of the regulatory system. These features exert an important 
influence on a number of different aspects of the UK system which, taken together, 
represent a distinctive style of regulation. From the international perspective, the 
style of regulation in the UK system can be viewed as a form of adaptation of inter-
national and EC measures to the local environment through the practice of 
regulation, rather than through adjustment of rules. 
5.1 Moral hazard and ‘too big to fail’ 
Moral hazard poses a problem for regulatory systems because financial institutions 
and their customers are likely to change their behaviour if there is either an explicit 
or implicit understanding that the relevant authorities.38 are likely to intervene in the 
event of financial difficulty to prevent insolvency. Such intervention is often based 
on the principle of ‘lender of last resort’, according to which central banks should 
provide financial assistance on a discretionary basis to banks which are illiquid but 
solvent to stem a crisis which could lead to the failure of a bank or banks.39 While 
concerns over financial stability may override moral hazard concerns in specific 
circumstances, there is clearly a risk over the long term if the authorities create an 
implicit expectation of intervention. Such expectations arise in particular in connec-
tion with institutions that are deemed ‘too big to fail’ because of their systemic 
significance.40 While Northern Rock did not clearly fall into that category.41 and the 
                                                                                                                                               
36  The statutory objectives are set out in section 2 of FSMA 2000. They are: market 
confidence; financial stability; the protection of consumers; and the reduction of financial crime. 
37  See FSMA 2000, sections 138 and 157. 
38  In the UK, the Tripartite Authorities. 
39  See A. Campbell and R. Lastra, ‘Revisiting the Lender of Last Resort – The Role of the 
Bank of England’, chapter 10 in MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., supra n. 24; and generally W. 
Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London, C. Kegan Paul & Co 
1873). 
40  See, generally, E. Greene, K. McIlwain and J. Scott, ‘A Closer Look at “Too Big to Fail”’, 5 
Capital Markets Law Journal (2010) p. 117. 
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Bank of England in particular stressed the moral hazard of intervention in that case,42 
the position changed when it became clear that other protective options were lim-
ited.43 When it later transpired that RBS and then HBOS had been critically damaged 
by the unfolding crisis, there was no reference to moral hazard, and government 
intervention in the form of recapitalisation through share issues (and later a govern-
ment-promoted merger between Lloyds and HBOS) was deemed necessary to ensure 
financial stability. While it provided an immediate solution, that intervention left 
open the problem of how to deal with the problems of moral hazard and the ‘too big 
to fail’ issue in the longer term. 
The Banking Act 2009 provided statutory recognition to the Bank of England’s 
role in the maintenance of financial stability but did not materially alter the pre-crisis 
position with respect to moral hazard. The new legislative framework does not 
clarify whether or in what circumstances the Bank or England should act as ‘lender 
of last resort’. While some regard this ‘creative ambiguity’ as having the potential to 
limit moral hazard, since it stresses the discretionary nature of ‘lender of last resort’ 
funding, others have argued that it simply confuses and complicates the resolution of 
crises.44 Moreover, the reluctance of the UK government to countenance the insol-
vency of a large UK bank.45 during the recent crisis combined with the political 
influence.46 that may be exerted over ‘lender of last resort’ interventions suggests that 
moral hazard remains a significant issue within the system. 
As far as ‘too big to fail’ is concerned, the effect of the government bailouts in 
the UK (and elsewhere) has been to increase concentration in both commercial and 
investment banking, with the result that the issue of ‘too big to fail’ has become even 
                                                                                                                                               
41  It represented only 3% of UK bank assets and its failure did not pose any significant threat to 
the inter-bank payments system. 
42  See Turmoil in Financial Markets, What Can Central Banks Do? (September 2007), Paper 
submitted to the Treasury Select Committee by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at: 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/treasurycommittee/other/paper070912.pdf>. 
43  In particular, the limited nature of the deposit guarantee scheme then in operation in the UK 
and the (perceived) restrictions imposed by the EC Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6, OJ 
2003 L 96/16) on the provision of covert support (with a view to avoiding the market stigma 
associated with access to ‘lender of last resort’ support provided by the Bank of England). 
44  Campbell and Lastra, supra n. 39, at p. 166, argue: ‘The assumed benefits of “constructive 
ambiguity” do not actually exist. Ambiguity and uncertainty as to the procedures and loci of power 
are not constructive. In the event of a crisis, the procedures to be followed should be crystal clear 
ex ante for the institution affected, the other market participants and the public at large.’ 
45  This approach stands in contrast to the willingness to permit the failure (albeit followed by 
nationalisation or sale of parts of the business) of financial institutions that did not have systemic 
implications such as the Dunfermline Building Society, London Scottish Bank plc, and Bradford 
and Bingley Building Society. 
46  The Bank of England enjoys independence in relation to its role in monetary policy under 
the Banking Act 1998 but not in respect of its role in the maintenance of financial stability, 
regarding which the Treasury can be expected to continue to exercise significant influence as the 
ultimate source of funds for rescue operations. 
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more significant as a regulatory concern. A regulatory response to the issue is com-
plicated by the fact that ‘too big to fail’ encompasses several different 
considerations: banks that are too big to manage effectively; banks that are too big to 
close because of complexity and customer/counterparty detriment; banks that are too 
big to separate from their markets because of systemic effects; and banks that are 
‘too big to bail’ because the cost is too high. While (as discussed below) there have 
been improvements to the crisis management and resolution regime, such ex post 
measures leave open the issue of how to avoid ex ante the need to deal with the 
potential failure of an institution that is ‘too big to fail’. Various options have been 
proposed for dealing with that issue.47 but none have attracted strong support in the 
UK, not least because they represent significant constraints on banks without clear 
evidence that they would have helped to avoid the recent crisis.48 Thus, the ‘too big 
to fail’ issue remains unresolved.49 and perhaps this is inevitable as it is very difficult 
and probably unhelpful to attempt to establish ex ante a point at which that position 
is reached and how the authorities may react. The central role of banks and financial 
institutions in the economy means that there will always be a point at which political 
intervention is deemed to be in the public interest. Moreover, as in the case of other 
key government decisions, it does not seem realistic or possible to limit freedom of 
action by reference to unknown future events, not least because the very nature of 
government intervention means that the political philosophy underpinning interven-
tion (or the lack of it) is likely to change over time. 
5.2 Crisis management and the resolution regime 
One of the clear lessons from the financial crisis was the lack of an adequate legal 
framework for crisis management of failing financial institutions in the UK.50 While 
the Bank of England was able to respond to market-wide demand for extra liquidity, 
the possibility of intervention in individual institutions by the regulatory authorities 
was limited by a lack of formal powers enabling them to take control of failing 
institutions. Meanwhile, the option of permitting insolvency was complicated by the 
                                                                                                                                               
47  The options are: limiting the size of financial institutions; increasing capital requirements to 
a level that limits the possibility of failure; separating ‘utility banking’ from investment banking; 
improving systemic risk monitoring and supervision; and implementing effective resolution 
regimes to permit effective regulatory intervention in failing banks. See, generally, Greene, et al., 
supra n. 40; and Treasury Committee, Too Important to Fail – Too Important to Ignore (HC 261) 
(March 2010). 
48  See HM Treasury, supra n. 23, at paras. 5.29-5.38. 
49  But see infra in section 5.2, referring to ‘living wills’ as a partial solution. 
50  This defect was common to many systems: see, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Consultative Document. Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group (September 2009), at: <http://www.asbaweb.org/Consulta-Reporte.pdf>; E. 
Hüpkes, ‘ “Form Follows Function” – A New Architecture for Regulating and Resolving Global 
Financial Institutions’, 10 European Business Organization Law Review (2009) pp. 369-385. 
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absence of a special insolvency regime for banks, which meant that customer depos-
its and other claims could be frozen for a long period of time pending the working 
out of the insolvency procedure.51 Thus, it became clear over time that limited crisis 
management options were themselves a causal factor in determining the conse-
quences of the crisis. 
To remedy the situation, several changes have been made.52 First, a special reso-
lution regime (SRR) was introduced by the Banking Act 2009. The SRR empowers 
the Bank of England, acting in consultation with the FSA and the Treasury, to initiate 
three stabilisation options in respect of a failing bank: transfer to a private sector 
purchaser; transfer to a bridge bank; or transfer to temporary public ownership. 
While the first of these options is in principle available through the normal market 
mechanism of a takeover, the experience of the financial crisis was that such a 
transaction could not be agreed and implemented against a background of volatile 
market conditions and major concerns over the solvency of the relevant institutions.53 
Second, the insolvency regime for banks was amended and linked to the SRR, the 
main policy objective being to ensure that the authorities could override the rights of 
shareholders and bondholders that would normally apply in a restructuring. Changes 
were also made to the deposit protection system to ensure that where a bank fails, 
depositors are paid out promptly.54 Along with amendment of the general law on 
liquidation, a special administration regime for failing banks was also introduced by 
the Banking Act 2009. It is intended to deal with circumstances where only part of a 
failing bank is transferred to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank: in those 
circumstances an administrator may be appointed to ensure that essential services 
and facilities that cannot be transferred are continued for a period of time. Both the 
liquidation and the administration procedures form part of the SRR in that the Bank 
of England is empowered to apply to the court for an order in each case. Finally, the 
FSA will require systemically significant financial institutions to produce so-called 
‘living wills’ so as to facilitate the resolution of financial difficulty without systemic 
disruption and without the need for funding from public finances.55 Such ‘living 
wills’ will comprise a recovery plan and a resolution plan; the former will focus on 
how a firm would respond to a severe stress (e.g., by selling parts of its business and 
‘de-risking’ its balance sheet) while a resolution plan would focus on how the firm 
                                                                                                                                               
51  See The Run on the Rock, supra n. 9, at para. 197: ‘The Governor [of the Bank of England] 
pointed out that the UK authorities were alone in the G7 in being unable to deal with a distressed 
bank under a special resolution regime, relying instead on normal corporate insolvency laws.’ 
52  For developments in cross-border crisis management, see the principles agreed by the 
Financial Stability Forum in March 2009, at: <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_0904c.pdf>. 
53  See The Run on the Rock, supra n. 9, at paras. 113-115. 
54  Under standard UK insolvency procedures the depositors would not be paid promptly even if 
they fell within the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under Part XV of the FSMA 2000. 
55  See FSA Discussion Paper 09/4, Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper (October 
2009), Annex 1. 
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would facilitate the exercise by the authorities of any of the options available under 
the SRR.56 
While it is difficult to assess in retrospect the difference that these procedures 
would have made to the outcome of the financial crisis, it seems clear that they will 
play a significant role in the future. However, it is probably wrong to conclude that 
more effective crisis management eliminates the possibility of political intervention 
(in the form of financial support from public funds) in the future, especially if it is 
the case that the international trend moves more towards the protection of national 
subsidiaries rather than global groups in crisis situations involving systemically 
important firms. In that scenario, it is possible to envisage that political intervention 
would attract stronger national support as public funding would be focused on the 
national subsidiary rather than spread across a global group.57 
5.3 ‘Light touch’ regulation 
Although the FSA has never explicitly endorsed the ‘light touch’ descriptor,58 there is 
no doubt that it was in the ascendancy prior to the crisis and represented a de facto 
limitation on the very broad powers and extensive discretion that were given to the 
regulator (FSA) by the enabling legislation, the FSMA 2000. The approach was 
described by the FSA itself in the following terms: 
The historical philosophy was that supervision was focused on ensuring that the 
appropriate systems and controls were in place and then relied on management to 
make the right judgment. Regulatory intervention would thus only occur to force 
changes in systems and controls or to sanction transgressions which were based 
on historical facts. It was not seen as a function of the regulator to question the 
overall business strategy of the institution or more generally the possibility of risk 
crystallising in the future.59 
Changes to the model of supervision implemented through the Supervisory En-
hancement Programme are based on the premise that ‘the new model of supervision 
is designed to deliver a more intrusive and direct regulatory style than the FSA has 
previously adopted and requires a “braver” approach to decision-making by supervi-
sors’.60 Linked with that change in basic regulatory philosophy is a new approach to 
                                                                                                                                               
56  The resolution plan would build on existing protections that facilitate an orderly exercise of 
the resolution options, such as the requirement of segregation of client assets and the requirement 
for a ‘single customer view’ (setting out the net position of each customer with the firm) to be 
introduced by the end of 2010. 
57  See, generally, FSA Discussion Paper 09/4, supra n. 55, for further discussion of this issue. 
58  See The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 86, referring to it as ‘somewhat of a caricature, and 
a term which the FSA never itself used’. 
59  FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at para. 11.14. 
60  Ibid., at para. 11.15. 
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enforcement in which the FSA has abandoned the mantra of ‘not being an enforce-
ment-led regulator’ in favour of a more overt and aggressive philosophy of ‘credible 
deterrence’. Recent high-profile investigations into insider-dealing rings said to be 
operating among market professionals.61 have provided plenty of high-profile evi-
dence of the new approach. However, it remains to be seen how far it will be carried 
into other areas, especially since in the past the FSA emphasised that supervisory 
engagement was often a superior alternative to formal enforcement.62 There can be 
little doubt that the FSA’s change of tack in regulatory philosophy has been driven 
by the fallout from the financial crisis (and the resulting public demand for more 
intensive regulation) even if there are overlapping elements of ongoing incremental 
change, such as the emphasis on senior management responsibility for firms’ com-
pliance. It remains to be seen what the new approach will mean as markets recover, 
not least since one of the clear lessons of the crisis is that formal regulatory powers 
and rhetoric are often quite far apart from the reality of regulation ‘in action’. 
5.4 Principles-based regulation 
The causal role of principles-based regulation.63 in the crisis is difficult to judge for 
several reasons. One is that it is often conflated with ‘light touch’ regulation even if 
there is no obvious reason why the two should be linked as ‘light touch’ regulation 
refers to the scale and intensity of regulatory intervention while principles-based 
regulation refers to the structure of the rule system that is employed within a regula-
tory system. However, to the extent that a ‘principles-based’ approach permits 
regulated firms considerable freedom in interpreting and implementing regulatory 
principles and rules, it is understandable that it can quite easily slip into the mode of 
‘light touch’ regulation. Another reason is that in different regulatory domains 
‘principles-based’ regulation carries different connotations: in accounting regulation 
it is often viewed as a superior alternative to a ‘rules-based’ approach,64 while in 
financial regulation it has become tainted by its linkage (at least in the UK context) 
with ‘light touch’ regulation. Finally, the characterisation of ‘principles-based’ 
regulation and ‘rules-based’ regulation as competing models confuses the fact that 
virtually all systems represent a mixture of both approaches.65 and therefore the 
                                                                                                                                               
61  See, e.g., ‘Seven Charged over Insider Trading Ring’, Financial Times, 31 March 2010. 
62  See, generally, I. MacNeil, ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Enforcement Action in the UK 
Capital Markets: A Case of “Less is More”’, 2 Capital Markets Law Journal (2007) p. 345. 
63  See, generally, FSA, Principles-Based Regulation: Focusing on the Outcomes That Matter 
(2007), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf>; and J. Black, ‘Making a Success of 
Principles-Based Regulation’, 1 Law and Financial Markets Review (2007) pp. 191-206. 
64  See D. Kershaw, ‘Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting 
Regulation’, 68 Modern Law Review (2005) pp. 594-625. 
65  See C.L. Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance and Principles-Based Securities Regulation’, 
at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=970130>. A cursory glance at the sheer scale of the FSA Handbook of 
Rules and Guidance (see: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>) serves to illustrate the point. 
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attribution of specific causal effects to ‘principles-based’ regulation is problematic. 
Nevertheless, it has been clear ever since the FSA Chief Executive Hector Sants 
remarked that ‘a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have 
no principles’66 that some change is likely in the FSA’s approach. While there is little 
evidence to date of any substantial change in the formal position of principles within 
the FSA rulebook, both the FSA’s re-denomination of ‘principles-based’ regulation 
as ‘outcomes-focused regulation’ and the change in basic regulatory philosophy and 
style outlined above suggest that there may well be significant changes ‘in action’. 
5.5 Macro-prudential regulation 
Linked with the new focus on financial stability in the statutory objectives of the 
FSA and the Bank of England is the issue of how the authorities should pursue that 
objective. Both the Turner Review and the FSA Regulatory Response noted that the 
regulatory approach in the past had put too much emphasis on the solvency and 
prudential supervision of individual financial institutions and not enough on systemic 
risk.67 The solution proposed by both reviews is that regulatory policy be developed 
to give greater weight to macroeconomic factors so as to make the financial system 
as a whole more resilient in the face of turmoil and economic downturn. The concept 
of macro-prudential regulation is described in the FSA Regulatory Response as ‘an 
assessment of how well the statutory Pillar 1 capital requirements provide effective 
risk capture across the banking sector, given prevailing economic conditions, and 
structural changes in the economy and financial sector’.68 Giving effect to this policy 
would require changes across a number of areas, but three proposals are of particular 
importance. One is that banks should be subject to an asset-based leverage ratio. 
Such a ratio would differ from risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios under the Basel 
regime in that assets would not be weighted and therefore errors in risk-weighting 
(which represent an assessment of risk) would be reduced. Such an approach could 
help to mitigate distortions arising from internal modelling of risk for those banks 
that are permitted to use the Internal Ratings Basis under Basel II. As well as provid-
ing a control technique at the micro-prudential level, it would also have a system-
wide influence in improving the quality of assets (loans and other financial instru-
ments) within the system as growth could not be achieved through expansion in low 
                                                                                                                                               
66  H. Sants, ‘Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence’, Speech at Reuters 
Newsmakers Event (12 March 2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/ 
Speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml>. 
67  This analysis also attracted support from influential independent commentators: see 
Brunnermeier, et al., supra n. 4. 
68  The focus of macro-prudential regulation is not simply the banking or financial system but 
broader issues such as inflation, asset prices, competition in markets, monetary and fiscal policy: 
see Bank of England Discussion Paper, The Role of Macroprudential Policy (November 2009), at 
para. 5.4. 
500 Iain MacNeil EBOR 11 (2010) 
risk-weighted assets. Another component of the new approach would be counter-
cyclical capital buffers, which would require formula-based reserves to be created 
during periods of economic growth to provide a buffer against the effects of eco-
nomic downturn. This type of reserve differs from the concept of regulatory capital 
adopted in the Basel regime in that regulatory capital is intended to protect primarily 
against credit and market risk over the duration of the relevant assets (loans, etc.) 
against which capital is held and no specific provision is made to protect against 
economic shocks or economic recession. As the Turner Review explained: ‘Under 
such a regime, required and actual capital would increase in good years when loan 
losses are below long run averages, creating capital buffers which would be drawn 
down in recession years as losses increase.’69 Both the Bank of England and the FSA 
support this approach on the basis that it reduces the extent to which bank behaviour 
may increase the amplitude of the economic cycle and therefore protects both the 
financial system and the wider economy. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether an international consensus on this type of ap-
proach can be achieved (which is not yet clear) there are two other potential barriers 
that will have to be surmounted. One is that counter-cyclical reserves will require 
banks to hold more capital.70 and will therefore increase the cost of credit; and while 
more regulation of banks has considerable public appeal, more costly credit does not. 
Second, the accounting treatment of such reserves poses problems that may result in 
the reform proposals becoming bogged down in arguments over their presentation. 
The significance of this issue is that it carries direct consequences for the stability of 
reported profits and the statement of net assets, both of which are linked to market 
valuations of banks’ shares. Another component of macro-prudential regulation 
would be a core funding ratio, which would require a minimum core of banks’ 
funding (deposits, money market borrowing, etc.) to come from sources of adequate 
quality which are sustainable through the economic cycle. This measure would 
impose a constraint on the overall quality of liabilities and would provide a policy 
tool that the regulatory authorities could adjust to constrain balance sheet growth in 
periods of economic expansion. 
At the institutional level, a move to macro-prudential regulation would imply a 
more direct role for the Bank of England in prudential supervision and not just in 
financial stability. The new Financial Policy Committee will provide a forum in 
which this approach can be developed.71 A significant issue is how much discretion 
should be left to the new Committee within the new macro-prudential framework. 
While discretion provides flexibility, it also makes decision-making less predictable 
                                                                                                                                               
69  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 61. 
70  Based on the FSA’s estimation of counter-cyclical reserves of 2 to 3% of risk-weighted 
assets at the top of the cycle (see FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at para. 5.31), capital 
requirements might have to rise by as much as 20% above current levels. 
71  See supra section 4 (institutional structure). 
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for the markets and promotes uncertainty.72 Moreover, as developments in institu-
tional structure at the EC level (above) are likely to drive that system towards a 
greater focus on macro-prudential regulation, there is logic in aligning the UK sys-
tem both for the purposes of input to policy formation in the ESRC and in order to 
adjust the practice of prudential supervision in the UK to a more macro-prudential 
focus. However, these changes are unlikely to be evident in the medium term, not 
least since their precise scope and form are linked with the emerging (but by no 
means certain) consensus on changes to capital standards within the Basel Frame-
work and also on the dynamics of financial reform within the EC. The operation of 
both systems indicates that agreement on high-level principles is not always indica-
tive of agreement on how rules should be formulated or how they should work in 
practice. 
6. SCOPE OF REGULATION 
In common with other countries, the limited scope of the ‘regulatory perimeter’ has 
been identified as a primary cause of the crisis in the UK. While there has been some 
expansion in the scope of the FSMA 2000 regulatory regime in recent years,73 this 
trend has been overshadowed by the growth in entities that perform functions equiva-
lent to regulated entities without being regulated on a comparable basis. The Turner 
Review noted ‘the importance of ensuring that bank-like activities do not migrate 
outside the regulatory perimeter in order to escape capital and liquidity require-
ments’.74 Often referred to as ‘shadow banks’, these entities comprise primarily 
bank-sponsored SIVs,75 investment banks and mutual funds, which often perform a 
similar maturity transformation.76 function to banks but were not subject to the same 
regulatory capital requirements as commercial banks.77 Hedge funds, while not bank-
                                                                                                                                               
72  See Bank of England, supra n. 68, at para. 6.1. 
73  For example, mortgage brokers and non-life insurance intermediaries were brought within 
the FSMA 2000 regulatory perimeter in 2008. 
74  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 70. 
75  SIVs are ‘special investment vehicles’ set up (typically by originators of debt finance such 
as banks) to provide a structure for transactions such as securitisation. They are independent in 
formal legal terms from their sponsoring institution so as to avoid the accounting requirement to 
consolidate their activity with that of the sponsor. In that sense, they can be described as a form of 
‘off balance sheet’ financing. Independence also assists in ensuring that they are ‘bankruptcy 
remote’ from the creditors of their sponsor. 
76  Maturity transformation refers to the holding of assets and liabilities of different duration. 
Banks have always held long-term assets (loans) but short-term liabilities (deposits), thereby 
helping to stabilise the cash flow of households. Mutual funds (especially in the US) and SIVs (in 
many countries but especially the US and UK) increasingly undertook this function prior to the 
crisis, thereby earning the descriptor ‘shadow banks’. 
77  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 70, noting that UK mutual funds did not act in this way. 
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like in their activities, were viewed as posing significant procyclical systemic effects, 
especially as they struggled to meet redemptions in falling markets. 
While the Turner Review noted that limits to the scope of regulation and the as-
sociated growth in ‘shadow banking’ were factors in the emergence of the crisis, it 
was careful not to overstate the causal influence of regulatory arbitrage.78 In particu-
lar it noted that investment banks did not escape regulation in either the EC or the 
US: in the former, they were subject to the same capital requirements as commercial 
banks in respect of their trading books; while in the latter, the SEC applied the Basel 
trading book/market risk regime to investment banks. According to Turner, the most 
crucial problem with the investment banks was not regulatory arbitrage but the 
inadequacy of the capital required under the Basel and EC.79 trading book regimes, 
combined with inadequate focus on liquidity. Mutual funds and SIVs were different 
in that they fell entirely outside the regulatory regime for banks despite engaging in 
maturity transformation that was in many ways similar to what banks did. In that 
sense, regulatory arbitrage was a factor, but the causal influence is difficult to esti-
mate since it remained open to regulators to require more capital to be set against 
assets that had (legitimately.80) been moved off balance sheet.81 Thus, the capacity of 
regulators to use their powers was an issue that was closely linked with the scope of 
regulation, since the full scope of regulation can only be realised through a willing-
ness to make full and consistent use of discretionary powers across the entire 
regulatory perimeter. 
The limited reforms proposed to the scope of regulation in the UK reflect the mi-
nor causal influence of unregulated activity and regulatory arbitrage in bringing 
about the crisis.82 The Turner Review regarded inappropriate incentives within the 
regulatory system (such as the lower capital requirements for banks’ trading books 
                                                                                                                                               
78  Regulatory arbitrage refers to the selection of different regulatory regimes to structure legal 
entities or transactions by reference to the overall compliance cost (implicit as well as explicit) of 
each regime. For general background, see V. Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’, University of 
Colorado Working Paper Number 10-11, at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567212>. 
79  The EC regime for bank capital (including the ‘trading book’ in which banks act as principal 
in trading financial instruments) is contained in the Capital Requirements Directive (itself a 
combination of the Banking Consolidation Directive 2006/48/EC, OJ 2006 L 177/1 and the Capital 
Adequacy Directive 2006/49/EC, OJ 2006 L 177/201), which is implemented in the UK by the 
GENPRU and BIPRU blocks of the FSA Handbook. 
80  Financial regulators do not and cannot (under existing rules) prevent the movement of risk 
assets off a bank’s balance sheet. The legitimacy of such transactions is determined primarily by 
accounting rules which require a ‘true sale’ of the relevant assets. 
81  Under Pillar 2 of the Basel Framework and also under the FSA’s regulatory capital regime. 
82  Recent revelations that have emerged from the report of the supervisor of the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers (see ‘SEC Launches “Repo 105” Probe’, Financial Times, 30 March 2010) 
provide evidence of regulatory arbitrage – in Lehman’s case as between English law requirements 
for recognition of a valid ‘repo’ transaction and the accounting treatment of such a transaction in 
consolidated group accounts prepared under US GAAP – but do not alter the broader view that 
such regulatory arbitrage was not a major causal influence in the crisis. 
Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 503
that encouraged an expansion in traded financial instruments that were exposed to 
market risk as well as credit risk) as a more important causal factor, and other com-
mentators have been more direct in drawing attention to the unwillingness of 
regulators to use their full powers in the run-up to the crisis.83 Nevertheless, impor-
tant changes to the scope of regulation are being made. In the case of hedge funds 
and credit rating agencies, the EC has been the main catalyst for change rather than 
the UK. Potential changes to the respective roles of home and host Member States 
carry less significance for the overall scope of regulation but do have important 
implications for the distribution of regulatory competence within the perimeter. 
6.1 Hedge funds 
Hedge funds have become a primary focus of attention in the debate over the scope 
of regulation around the world.84 The Turner Review, however, was quite tentative in 
its proposals and did not make a firm case for an extension of regulatory interven-
tion.85 This approach was premised on a number of factors: first, that hedge fund 
managers (albeit not the funds themselves as separate legal entities) are already 
regulated in the UK; second, that the extent to which hedge funds employ leverage is 
quite modest by comparison with banks; third, that they normally only deal directly 
with sophisticated investors; and finally, that any moves to extend prudential regula-
tion to the funds themselves would be problematic as most are based in ‘offshore’ 
jurisdictions. The EC’s proposed Directive on Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) 
Managers follows the indirect approach to regulation of hedge funds through the 
regulation of fund managers.86 In essence, the Directive aims to regulate the proprie-
tary investment strategy that is adopted by managers as a proxy for regulation of the 
fund itself. Thus, in addition to a requirement that AIF mangers be authorised by 
national regulators, the proposed Directive will require AIF managers to satisfy 
national regulators with respect to their risk management, particularly liquidity, and 
operational and counterparty risks associated with short-selling; the management and 
disclosure of conflicts of interest; the fair valuation of assets; and the security of the 
depository/custodial arrangements. The Directive also proposes that the EC Commis-
sion be empowered to set limits to the level of leverage that may be employed by 
reference to different types of fund. While the UK’s existing regulatory regime for 
hedge fund managers means that it cannot in principle object to the EC proposal, its 
                                                                                                                                               
83  See Brunnermeier, et al., supra n. 4; MacNeil, infra n. 190; and Spitzer, supra n. 3. 
84  See IOSCO, Hedge Funds Oversight: Final Report (June 2009), at: <http://www.iosco.org/ 
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf>. 
85  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at pp. 72-73. The FSA’s Regulatory Response was similarly 
tentative, focusing on the benefits of indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulation of 
regulated entities (such as investment banks providing prime brokerage services) that have 
relationships with hedge funds: see FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at paras. 6.14-6.27. 
86  See COM (2009) 207 final. 
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leading position as a location for hedge fund management means that it cannot 
readily support forms of regulation that threaten its competitive position. Thus, it is 
not surprising that the legislative progress of the proposal was delayed by direct 
intervention by the British Prime Minister,87 especially since there is the suspicion in 
some quarters that this represents only the first part of a broader EC movement to 
rein in the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation in the UK, which many have viewed 
as being at least a cultural if not a direct causal factor underlying the crisis. 
6.2 Credit rating agencies 
The role of credit ratings and the credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the crisis illus-
trates the complexity of the causal influences that contributed to the crisis. Outside 
the United States,88 credit rating agencies were not regulated prior to the crisis.89 
However, they formed a material part of the regulatory structure since, as the FSA 
commented, ‘the regulatory framework places significant reliance on external ratings 
as part of the calculation of capital requirements under the Capital Requirements 
Directive’.90 In that sense, a significant aspect of capital adequacy regulation was 
contracted out to private organisations whose initial allocation of credit ratings and 
subsequent changes (especially downgrades) would carry serious implications for the 
entire global financial system, especially as leverage increased over time. 
It is also clear that investors relied too much on credit ratings in making invest-
ment decisions, especially in the case of structured finance products such as CDOs,91 
where credit ratings in many cases became a substitute for fundamental analysis and 
due diligence by investors.92 As the crisis unfolded, that reliance was exacerbated by 
the incorporation of ratings ‘triggers’ into financial products. While such contractual 
techniques were devised as a protective device for investors, it became clear during 
the crisis that they posed real problems for risk management in financial institutions 
                                                                                                                                               
87  See ‘Brown Delays Hedge Fund Reform’, Financial Times, 16 March 2010. Following the 
change of government in the UK in early May, it subsequently became clear that the delay was no 
more than that, with the result that the UK is likely to have to accept stricter hedge fund regulation: 
see ‘Osborne Bows to EU Hedge Fund Rules’, Financial Times, 20 May 2010. 
88  See T. Möllers, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies: The New US and EU Law – Important 
Steps or Much Ado about Nothing?’, 4 Capital Markets Law Journal (2009) pp. 477-501, for a 
comparison of the US and EU approaches. 
89  While Art. 81 of the EC Capital Requirements Directive (2006/48, OJ 2006 L 177/1) 
required that credit ratings used in connection with the risk weighting of assets (for the purposes of 
the calculation of regulatory capital) be issued by a rating agency that was recognised as ‘eligible’ 
by at least a single Member State, this process did not amount to licensing or supervision in a form 
comparable to that imposed on banks, insurers and investment firms under the EC regulatory 
regime. 
90  FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at para. 1.57. 
91  Collateralised debt obligations. These instruments are a technique for repackaging 
underlying debt obligations for onward sale to investors in the form of asset-backed bonds. 
92  FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at para. 1.56. 
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and also threatened financial stability by creating uncertainty as to the scale and 
location of losses that followed a credit downgrade. 
Over-reliance on credit ratings was also evident in the operation of the financial 
guarantee insurance market, where ratings of both the insurers and the underlying 
credit risk covered by guarantees were the main drivers of the market.93 While these 
considerations alone raise serious concerns about the central role that credit ratings 
have come to occupy, they are given further weight by the conflicts of interest that 
are faced by the credit rating agencies. These conflicts arise from the business model 
operated by the agencies under which they charge issuers for ratings and are often 
(.particularly in the case of innovative products in structured finance) employed to 
provide consulting services in respect of the products that they will rate.94 The risk in 
such cases, even where there are internal processes for managing conflicts, is that the 
agency provides a favourable rating to an issuer to secure fees.95 For the system as a 
whole this has the effect both of over-pricing the relevant products at the outset and 
of creating the potential for systemic instability as a wave of selling by investors 
follows subsequent downgrades.96 
The relatively rapid adoption by the EC authorities of a Regulation.97 on credit rat-
ing agencies in 2009 reflected the causal impact of credit ratings in the crisis,98 the 
relatively undeveloped state of EC regulation and the rather weak ‘comply or ex-
plain’ framework adopted by the IOSCO Code of Conduct,99 which relies on 
voluntary compliance. The new EC framework is based on registration and supervi-
sion, undertaken primarily by the national authority in the country where registration 
is sought.100 but with a role for the CESR,101 to which the application is to be made in 
the first instance, and for a college of supervisors drawn from the competent authori-
ties of Member States in which the activities of the credit rating agency is likely to 
have a significant impact. Among the requirements for registration are important 
provisions relating to conflicts of interest and disclosure of credit rating methodol-
                                                                                                                                               
93  See the Joint Forum (comprising the Basel Committee, the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissioners and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors), 
Differentiated Nature of Financial Regulation (January 2010), at p. 78, at: <http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/joint24.pdf>. 
94  See F. Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers’, 
at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257>. 
95  Ibid., at p. 70. 
96  Some institutional investors may be forced to sell by their investment mandate following 
downgrades, contributing to a downward spiral. 
97  Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, OJ 2009 L 302/1. 
98  See Recital 10 of the Regulation. 
99  See IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies, at: <http://www. 
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD173.pdf>. 
100  The primacy of national regulators is reflected in the fact that the registration decision (Art. 
14(4)) and enforcement measures (Art. 23) are reserved to the competent national authority, albeit 
subject to consultation obligations. 
101  The Committee of European Securities Regulators: see: <http://www.cesr-eu.org>. 
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ogy. As to the former, the Regulation draws a distinction between ‘consultancy and 
advisory services’, which may not be provided to the rated entity, and ‘ancillary 
services’,102 which may. The objective is to restrict the ability of CRAs to act in the 
dual capacity of adviser to the rated entity and independent assessor of the credit 
quality of the entity’s debt securities. As to the latter, the Regulation requires that 
CRAs make a wide range of disclosures including: historical performance data to be 
made available in a central repository established by the CESR; their methodologies 
and key rating assumptions; the identity of significant clients; details about their 
legal structure and ownership: and a split of fees as between those derived from 
credit rating and those from other activities.103 The new regulatory regime is also 
viewed by the EC authorities as a means to tackle the lack of qualitative competition 
in the market for credit ratings since regulatory approval (combined with increasing 
convergence between the US and EC regimes) has the capacity to overcome the 
entry barrier for new entrants posed by their lack of market reputation. However, 
even the Regulation itself recognises the initial and provisional nature of the regula-
tory regime that it creates: there remain important issues to be clarified and 
developed, especially as regards the boundary between consulting and credit rating 
activities, the capacity of individual Member States to supervise CRAs and the 
appropriateness of the existing rating recommendations and symbols for structured 
finance products.104 
6.3 The role of home and host states 
The identification of separate roles for the home state of a bank and a host state in 
which it conducts foreign operations is long-established in both the Basel and EC 
regulatory frameworks.105 While the former prioritises the role of the host state in 
supporting consolidated supervision of international activities by the home state, the 
latter is more far-reaching in its scope and effect, reflecting the high-level objective 
of the creation of a single market and the harmonisation programme which has 
sought to implement that objective. In particular, two techniques adopted within the 
EC regime constrain the role of host states in relation to branches of EC banks: first, 
the ‘single licence’ principle according to which authorisation and supervision are 
                                                                                                                                               
102  The Regulation (Annex 1, part B, para. 4) cites as examples of ancillary services market 
forecasts, estimates of economic trends and pricing analysis. 
103  See Art. 6 and section E of Annex 1 to the Regulation. 
104  See Möllers, supra n. 88, at pp. 499-500. 
105  As regards the Basel regime, see The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(1977), at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf>; and for the EC, the Capital Requirements 
Directive, supra n. 79. 
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the responsibility of the home state;106 and second, the ‘passporting’ principle, which 
permits the establishment of branches by EC-authorised banks on the basis of their 
home state authorisation.107 While the EC system was premised on likely benefits in 
terms of competition and lower funding costs for business and consumers, the regu-
latory risks inherent in the system became clear following the collapse of three 
Icelandic banks that operated in the UK under the EC ‘passport’.108 Under the EC 
system, supervisory requirements and deposit guarantee arrangements are set by the 
home state and in this case it became clear that the scale of the losses suffered by 
depositors vastly exceeded the fund available under the Icelandic guarantee arrange-
ments. Quite apart from the political ramifications that ensued in Iceland regarding 
the responsibility and accountability of its bankers and regulators, these events drew 
attention to the consequences of disparity in regulatory capacity and resources be-
tween the different participants in (an ostensibly) harmonised system. At the broader 
international level, it became apparent during the crisis that national regulators were 
focused on protecting and rescuing domestic banks rather than the local operations of 
foreign banks. 
In response to the crisis, reforms have been proposed both within the EC and in 
the international system. The FSA, for example, has put forward three options for 
modification of the current EC regime: first, a system of peer review to ensure 
effective supervision ‘in action’ in all Member States; second, extending the powers 
of host states over branches; and third, making the operation of ‘passporting’ subject 
to an EC-wide regulatory framework such as a pre-funded deposit guarantee 
scheme.109 While progress on this issue is linked with the evolution of the role of the 
new European System of Financial Supervisors, it seems that both the objective of 
that body and emerging policy proposals.110 within the EC favour deeper integration 
rather than the allocation of greater powers to host Member States. Also linked with 
this issue is the treatment of systemically important banks. The FSA’s approach to 
                                                                                                                                               
106  Art. 41, first sub-paragraph, of Directive 2006/48/EC provides that host Member States 
retain responsibility for the supervision of liquidity of branches of EC credit institutions, but only 
‘pending further coordination’. 
107  The passport does not apply to subsidiaries, which must be authorised by the host state. 
108  For general background, see: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/landsbanki.htm> (30 April 
2010). Passporting covers EEA member states such as Iceland. 
109  FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at p. 156. The reference to an ‘EU-wide framework’ 
seems to envisage rules and regulatory bodies operating at EC level rather than the current system 
of EC-produced rules implemented in different ways in different Member States. See also ibid., at 
p. 101, canvassing the twin options of ‘more Europe’ or ‘less Europe’; and The Turner Review, 
supra n. 7, at p. 102, supporting ‘more Europe’. 
110  See, e.g., the Commission working document published in connection with the public 
hearing on 26 April 2010 regarding changes to the Capital Requirements Directive, proposing (at 
para. 28) greater home state supervision over the liquidity of bank branches operating in other 
Member States, at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation 
_paper_en.pdf>. 
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that issue has been to argue in favour of some form of regulatory capital surcharge to 
reflect the heightened systemic risk posed by such institutions.111 However, an alter-
native proposal has focused on requiring systemically significant branches to 
incorporate as local subsidiaries, thereby subjecting them to the same capital and 
liquidity regime as domestic banks.112 The direction of change on this issue is likely 
to prove very significant for the EC, in particular as the common currency area rules 
out the possibility of the use of monetary policy at the national level to constrain 
expansion in bank lending. Powers available to host states to adjust liquidity re-
quirements or counter-cyclical charges could provide an alternative policy tool to 
achieve that objective.113 
6.4 Adjustments to the FSMA 2000 regime 
In response to concerns.114 that the FSA lacks direct powers over unregulated parent 
companies that control regulated entities within a group structure, the FSA has made 
changes to the ‘approved persons’ regime. This regime limits the performance of 
‘controlled functions’ to ‘approved persons’ and represents a technique whereby the 
FSA can control both entry into the relevant function and its performance. Changes 
made to the FSA Handbook in 2009.115 brought within the definition of ‘controlled 
function’ persons (such as partners, officers, senior managers or employees) of a 
parent undertaking or holding company whose decisions or actions are regularly 
taken into account by the governing body of an authorised firm. This serves the 
purpose not only of extending the reach of FSA regulation but also of reinforcing the 
FSA’s policy of increased focus on competence and capability in senior management 
appointments in regulated firms as well as on the recognition of personal (as opposed 
to entity) responsibility for failures. 
The expansion in the information-gathering powers of the FSA is contained in the 
Financial Services Act 2010.116 Currently, the FSA’s powers can be exercised only 
within the regulatory perimeter, albeit that this extends to collection of information 
on unregulated activity that is undertaken by a regulated entity and on exposure to 
unregulated counterparties of regulated entities. The expanded power will enable the 
FSA to collect information that is relevant to the stability of the financial system 
                                                                                                                                               
111  See FSA Discussion Paper 09/4, supra n. 55, at para. 3.54. 
112  See Brunnermeier, et al., supra n. 4, at para. 3.4 and chapter 7. 
113  See A. Persuad, Macro-Prudential Regulation (World Bank, Crisis Response, Note Number 
6, July 2009), at: <http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note6.pdf>. 
114  See FSA Regulatory Response, supra n. 8, at paras. 6.7-6.13. 
115  See FSA Policy Statement 09/14, The Approved Persons Regime – Significant Influence 
Function Review (July 2009). Further refinement of the regime is proposed in FSA Consultation 
Paper 10/3, Effective Corporate Governance (Significant Influence Controlled Functions and the 
Walker Review) (January 2010). 
116  Section 18. 
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directly from owners or managers of investment funds or persons connected to them 
and service providers to authorised firms.117 While the effective exercise of this 
power may in some cases be limited by the territorial limits of the FSA’s jurisdiction 
(e.g., in respect of ‘offshore’ funds managed from the UK), its overall effect is likely 
to be beneficial in facilitating the development of a more complete picture of the 
nature and scale of risk accumulation and transfer, especially in the less transparent 
areas of the market.118 
7. CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
In common with most other countries, the UK regulatory authorities concluded that 
inadequate capital in the banking sector was a major cause of the financial crisis. 
This conclusion was hardly surprising in the light of the recapitalisation of several 
major UK banks (RBS, HBOS and Lloyds) by the government or, in the case of the 
stronger banks (such as Barclays, HSBC and Standard Chartered) recapitalisation by 
shareholders and new investors. The first stage in the process of bolstering capital 
was the demand from the markets that counterparties be adequately capitalised as a 
condition for access to wholesale funding. It was this influence that drove both 
government and private investment in the banking sector and resulted in capital 
ratios rising significantly by the end of 2008. The sharp rise in financial markets in 
2009 brought further benefits as even those banks that had been in danger of sinking 
in 2008 benefitted as rising asset values boosted their balance sheets.119 Against this 
background, regulatory proposals for higher minimum capital requirements were 
probably of less immediate significance although there can be little doubt that they 
are necessary to ensure adequate levels of capital since market discipline is unlikely 
to prove a reliable constraint as the crisis recedes. However, recognition of the 
necessity for reform has not been translated into action at the international level. 
While the Basel Committee has set out a clear agenda for increasing capital require-
ments,120 political agreement at the international level is a more problematic issue, 
despite the considerable impetus provided by support from the Obama administration 
                                                                                                                                               
117  Moreover, the Treasury is empowered to prescribe further categories of person in respect of 
whom the FSA’s extended information-gathering power may be exercised. 
118  While the transaction reporting regime established by Art. 25 MiFID provides regulators 
with transaction details from the OTC market in respect of trading in financial instruments admitted 
to trading on regulated markets, there remains a substantial volume of OTC trade that is not in such 
instruments (e.g., credit default swaps). 
119  See FSA, Financial Risk Outlook 2010, at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/financial_ 
risk_outlook_2010.pdf>, at p. 22, for details of the recent evolution of UK banks’ capital adequacy 
ratios. 
120  See the Basel Committee’s Consultative Document Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector (December 2009), at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.htm>. 
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in the US.121 Furthermore, with the effect of the rescue measures and implicit support 
through monetary policy already feeding through to bank profitability (and stronger 
capital ratios), dilution of the Basel Committee’s far-reaching proposals before their 
end-2012 target implementation date seems ever more likely. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that minimum levels of capital are in any event not a very clear guide to 
appropriate levels of capital in individual cases, a point explicitly recognised by 
Pillar 2 of the Basel Framework and the ARROW framework adopted by the FSA in 
the UK. From that perspective, the solution lies in the hands of national regulators, 
who should be bolder in their implementation of Pillar 2. 
Changes to the capital regime in the EC following the financial crisis have fo-
cused on implementation of the interim measures adopted by the Basel Committee in 
July 2009.122 The main effect of the changes to capital requirements that are in the 
process of being adopted in the EC,123 and will be implemented in the UK from 
January 2011,124 is that higher levels of capital will be required in respect of positions 
held in the ‘trading book’125 of banks and in respect of repackaging securitisations 
(e.g., in the form of collateralised debt obligations). The effect on individual institu-
tions will depend on the extent to which they engage in such activity. There are also 
provisions that encourage greater due diligence to be undertaken prior to investment 
in securitised products through the attachment of a higher risk-weighting where that 
does not occur and also a requirement that originators of securitisations retain a 
material economic interest as an incentive to monitor more effectively the quality of 
the underlying assets. In aggregate, the FSA expects the capital changes to be 
equivalent to around a one percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets (based on balance sheets at the end of 2009, which include new 
capital raised in 2008 and 2009).126 Although the incremental regulatory requirement 
                                                                                                                                               
121  See ‘Differences Persist over Tougher Regime’, Financial Times, 26 April 2010, reporting 
on differences between the G20 members and within the IMF over the scale of the increase 
required and the techniques to be used. 
122  See the Basel Committee’s Enhancements to the Basel II Framework (July 2009), at: 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm>. 
123  The changes are contained in amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive, supra n. 
79. For further details regarding the ongoing process, see: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
bank/regcapital/index_en.htm>. These standards take the EC beyond those of the Basel Committee 
guidelines and promote greater harmonisation within the EC. 
124  The changes will be made mainly through the FSA rulebook but changes to the institutional 
structure of regulation resulting from the EC proposals discussed in section 4 will be implemented 
in regulations made by the Treasury: see FSA Consultation Paper 09/29, Strengthening Capital 
Standards 3 (December 2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_29.pdf>; and HM 
Treasury, Implementing Amendments to the CRD (December 2009), at: <http://www.hm-treasury. 
gov.uk/d/consult_capital_requirements_directive.pdf>. 
125  This activity is often referred to as ‘proprietary trading’ and involves taking risk on to 
banks’ balance sheet as a principal rather than acting in a representative capacity for a client to 
whom the risk is ultimately transferred. 
126  FSA Consultation Paper 09/29, supra n. 124. 
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is quite small, the overall increase in capital has been substantial and it seems clear 
that, at least for the foreseeable future, regulators’ capacity to use discretionary 
powers to require even higher levels of capital has been strengthened.127 
While the EC measures referred to above did not specifically address liquidity,128 
the UK has taken independent action on this front, reflecting the distinct causal role 
of the withdrawal of liquidity in the crisis. The overall effect is to strengthen liquid-
ity within the financial system and reduce reliance on short-term money market 
funding. Branches of foreign firms as well as UK-authorised firms.129 will be ex-
pected to comply with the two high-level principles of ‘adequate liquidity’ and ‘self-
sufficiency’, although the latter is open to waiver or modification by the FSA. While 
these changes have generally been welcomed in the markets, it has been observed 
that disproportionate costs (in terms of systems and reporting obligations) may be 
imposed on firms which do not pose significant systemic threats.130 
Linked with the inadequacy of capital is the accounting treatment of assets and 
liabilities held by financial institutions. The significance of accounting treatment is 
that capital (including reserves attributable to shareholders) does not have an inde-
pendent existence: it represents simply the residual difference between assets and 
liabilities and is therefore a function of the values attached to each. Furthermore, as 
leverage increases within the financial system, the manner in which assets and 
liabilities are recorded assumes greater significance since the residual capital be-
comes ever smaller by comparison with the balance sheet and therefore more 
volatile. The Turner Review recognised the role of ‘mark to market’ accounting.131 in 
fuelling the credit boom (since it helped to create the impression of new capital as 
markets rose) and equally in exacerbating the downturn as the cycle turned.132 How-
ever, having implicated ‘mark to market’ in the upswing, neither Turner nor the FSA 
Regulatory Response expressed fundamental dissatisfaction with ‘mark to market’ 
                                                                                                                                               
127  Reflecting the shift in regulatory dynamics in support of regulatory intervention, the FSA 
Chairman has recently proposed that the FSA consider adopting a system of sectoral risk-weighting 
of banks’ assets with a view to limiting rapid increases in bank lending to specific sectors, such as 
occurred in relation to (largely speculative) construction in the years prior to 2007: see ‘Turner 
Calls for Powers to Control Asset Bubbles’, Financial Times, 17 March 2010. The power to adopt 
such measures is already vested in the FSA, but exercise of this power would represent a change in 
regulatory philosophy towards a much more interventionist stance. 
128  Note, however, that the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) did issue 
recommendations in December 2009 on liquidity buffers and survival periods: see: <http://www.c-
ebs.org/Publications/Standards-Guidelines.aspx>. This followed the publication in September 2008 
of the Basel Committee’s (revised) Principles for Sound Risk Management and Supervision. 
129  The regime will apply to all ‘BIPRU’ firms, including UK banks, investment firms and 
building societies as well as UK branches of EEA and non-EEA banks. 
130  See G. Walker, ‘Liquidity Risk Management – Policy Conflict and Correction’, 4 Capital 
Markets Law Journal (2009) p. 451. 
131  The practice is an application of the general accounting principle that an asset should be 
recorded at the price that it could be sold for at the balance sheet date. 
132  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 65. 
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accounting, thereby leaving the door open for it to retain its role in the capital ade-
quacy framework. Broader questions about the role of ‘mark to market’ accounting 
in the financial reporting framework (applicable to all companies) are beyond the 
remit of the FSA, albeit that the financial sector is probably most affected. Ulti-
mately, this issue is likely to require resolution at the international level, since it is 
not feasible for the UK to act alone on accounting standards now that listed compa-
nies report under International Financial Reporting Standards, which are the 
responsibility of the International Accounting Standards Board. 
8. MARKET TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY 
Regulation of markets relies heavily on disclosure as a regulatory technique but the 
financial crisis has drawn attention to deficiencies in its operation. Two dimensions 
of disclosure have been particularly problematic. One is its role as a regulatory 
technique for protecting investors and another is its role as a technique for enhancing 
market transparency and integrity. As regards the first role, it has been argued that 
there has been over-reliance on the capacity of investors to make rational investment 
decisions even when extensive information is provided by issuers in compliance with 
disclosure obligations. On that view, the role of disclosure in the financial crisis calls 
for ‘a substantial overhaul of its processes, volume, timing and format to make it 
more effective’.133 On another view, this process might extend as far as prohibiting 
certain transactions (such as complex securitisations) in which the information 
asymmetry problem exceeds the bounds that can realistically be remedied by disclo-
sure.134 
As far as the role of disclosure in enhancing transparency and market integrity is 
concerned, the position of the UK is complex. On the one hand, the UK has a record 
of applying ‘gold-plating’ to EC minimum standards Directives in its ‘official list-
ing’ regime, ownership disclosure regime and transaction reporting regime, the 
rationale being that high standards promote investor protection and enhance market 
liquidity. On the other hand, the UK has also been a leader in the development of the 
‘over the counter’ (OTC) and structured finance markets,135 where disclosure of 
                                                                                                                                               
133  E. Avgouleas, ‘What Future for Disclosure As a Regulatory Technique? Lessons from 
Behavioural Decision Theory and the Global Financial Crisis’, in MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., 
supra n. 24, p. 231. 
134  Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis’, Utah Law 
Review (2008) p. 1109, and Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 203, at: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1113034>. 
135  The OTC market refers to the range of transactions (especially derivatives) that are 
undertaken on a bilateral basis between banks. There is no organised ‘market’ as such. Structured 
finance refers to financing techniques that repackage existing financial instruments: e.g., 
securitisation as a means to ‘sell’ mortgage portfolios to bond investors. 
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trading and market positions (both to regulators and market participants) is much 
more limited than in regulated markets. As much of the pre-crisis increase in trading 
volume and innovation in financial instruments occurred in those markets, the UK 
has a clear interest in ensuring that those markets remain centred in London, even if 
some changes to their mode of operation may be necessary. Thus, the argument that 
inadequate disclosure in respect of trading in and exposure to some instruments such 
as derivatives (where much of the trade is on the OTC market) was an important 
causal factor in the crisis can expect to receive only qualified acceptance in the UK. 
The Turner Review did not specifically address the role of disclosure, although it 
did consider the role of efficient market theory as a foundation for regulation, con-
cluding that there had been too strong a reliance on the self-correcting capacity of 
markets and that the ‘inherent instabilities in liquid markets’ should feature more 
prominently in the regulatory approach.136 That would suggest some limitation of the 
role of disclosure in investor protection although the precise direction of any such 
initiative remains difficult to read, at least as far as the wholesale financial markets 
are concerned.137 Nor did the FSA Regulatory Response highlight the limitations of 
disclosure as a regulatory technique, focusing instead on a relatively modest reform 
agenda centred on selective improvements to the transparency regime in certain 
market segments.138 
8.1 Market transparency 
The FSA Regulatory Response drew attention to the need to review transparency 
arrangements in markets.139 In doing so, it distinguished several different aspects of 
transparency: (a) pre- and post-trade transparency in the trading system; (b) transpar-
ency of positions to other market participants; (c) transparency in the nature of 
products for investors; and (d) transparency to the regulator about market transac-
tions. As regards (a), it noted that equity markets were subject to a harmonised EC 
regime under MiFID.140 that covers both pre-trade and post-trade transparency,141 but 
                                                                                                                                               
136  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 42. 
137  In retail financial markets there has already been evidence pre-crisis of a reduced role for 
disclosure in both the EC and UK regimes: see N. Moloney, How to Protect Investors (Cambridge 
University Press 2009), chapter 5. 
138  This impression is borne out by the FSA’s subsequent Discussion Paper 09/5 Enhancing 
Financial Reporting Disclosures by UK Credit Institutions (October 2009), which focused on 
improving comparability of disclosures between credit institutions and reducing complexity. 
139  FSA Regulatory Response, at pp. 172-175. 
140  The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 2004/39/EC OJ 2004 L 145/1. 
141  The equity regime in MiFID applies to shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
whether the trades take place on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility or OTC. Pre-trade 
transparency refers to the prices and volumes in which prospective transactions may be executed 
while post-trade transparency refers to the prices and volumes of executed trades. Both forms of 
transparency carry implications for the efficiency of markets in pricing securities. 
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that markets in other securities were not covered, with the result that there were 
disparate regimes in place across different Member States, often with no regulatory 
intervention in OTC markets. While the CESR concluded in its 2008 review of the 
bond markets.142 that there was no need for intervention, it later changed its view in 
favour of enhanced disclosure.143 Similarly, the FSA favours further development of 
post-trade transparency in non-equity markets, as does IOSCO.144 As regards (b), the 
FSA observed that a general obligation to disclose the nature and size of trading 
positions would undermine the operation of markets but recognised that the long-
standing exception made in the case of equity markets (based on the role of owner-
ship disclosure in corporate governance and control) was necessary and should be 
extended to all long positions in voting shares.145 The focus in respect of (c) has been 
on asset-backed and structured products, where a lack of investor understanding of 
risk led to inadequate due diligence and over-reliance on credit ratings. The regula-
tory response to this issue will inevitably be linked with the EC regulation of credit 
rating agencies and initiatives sponsored by IOSCO and the CESR. The latter has 
already recommended post-trade transparency requirements for asset-backed securi-
ties, which are often admitted to trading on regulated markets, and CDOs and credit 
default swaps (neither of which are commonly admitted to trading and therefore not 
currently within the MiFID post-trade transparency regime). In respect of (d), the 
FSA noted that it already had a substantial input of information, as even OTC market 
transactions may be subject to reporting requirements under MiFID if the relevant 
instruments are admitted to trading on a regulated market. However, it also stated 
that there could be a more effective focus on key risks, especially in regard to the 
                                                                                                                                               
142  This was a review undertaken for the purposes of providing advice to the Commission in 
connection with the report on pre-and post-trade transparency required by Art. 65(1) MiFID: for 
background, see the DG Internal Market and Services Working Document (April 2008), at: <http:// 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/nemt_report_en.pdf>. 
143  See CESR/09-348 (10 July 2009), recommending that the 2010 Commission revision of 
MiFID extend post-trade transparency to bonds for which a prospectus has been published or which 
have been admitted to trading on a multilateral trading facility. This measure was seen to have the 
potential to restore market confidence (by limiting asymmetry of information regarding trading 
prices and volumes in the absence of a post-trade reporting regime) and improve liquidity in 
normal times. 
144  See, e.g., IOSCO, Transparency of Structured Finance Products (September 2009), at: 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD306.pdf>. 
145  This extension occurred in June 2009 in the UK through changes to the FSA Handbook: see 
Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules 5.1 (Notification of the acquisition or disposal of major 
shareholdings) extending ownership notification requirements to financial instruments that are 
equivalent in economic terms to voting shares. At the EC level, the CESR has proposed an EC-
wide regime for such instruments, which currently fall outside the disclosure requirements of the 
Transparency Obligations Directive: see CESR /09-1215b (January 2010). 
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systemic risk that may arise in such markets as a result of counterparty exposure or a 
reduction in liquidity, both of which have been features of the recent crisis.146 
8.2 Market infrastructure 
In the wake of the financial crisis there have been calls for changes to be made to the 
market infrastructure for OTC derivatives. They range from proposals to mandate that 
that such instruments be required to trade ‘on exchange’, to more limited proposals that 
certain contracts (such as credit default swaps) be cleared through a central counter-
party. The latter has gained support from regulators including the FSA on the basis that 
such arrangements can reduce systemic counterparty risk and enhance the transparency 
to regulators of the positions taken by individual firms. However, unilateral action by 
the FSA on this front is unlikely, not least because EC initiatives.147 are ongoing, but 
also because there are risks associated with over-extending any requirement for central 
clearing: in particular that systemic risk is simply transferred to and accumulated 
within clearing houses and also that the standardisation in derivative contracts required 
for entry into clearing poses a threat to flexibility and innovation within the market. 
The FSA has stressed that the global nature of the derivatives market requires that any 
movement to expand clearing must not limit the ability of firms and clearing houses to 
manage risk on a cross-border basis and must allow for consistent and reliable informa-
tion flows among the national regulators. 
8.3 Market integrity 
When the uncertainty associated with the financial crisis prompted increased market 
volatility, the capacity for short-selling to destabilise the shares of financial institu-
tions who were engaged in capital-raising, as well as the broader market, became 
apparent. It was clear in particular that, in some instances, short-selling was accom-
panied by the creation of false and misleading market rumours. In the UK, the FSA 
responded by introducing, on an emergency basis, a prohibition on short-selling of 
financial sector stocks and a disclosure obligation in respect of short positions.148 The 
policy reasons given by the FSA for its move were that while short-selling was ‘a 
legitimate technique in normal market conditions’, it could be used to support abu-
sive practices and could contribute to disorderly markets when ‘herding’ leads to 
                                                                                                                                               
146  See also IOSCO consultation paper, supra n. 144, recommending greater post-trade 
transparency for structured finance products. 
147  See the CESR/ESCB consultation on clearing, settlement and central counterparty systems, 
at: <http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=contenu_search_res&searchkeyword=clearing&exact 
phrase=on&doconly=all&searchdatefromday=1&searchdatefrommonth=1&searchdatefromyear= 
2005&searchdatetoday=27&searchdatetomonth=5&searchdatetoyear=2010&x=54&y=18>. 
148  The measures took effect on 18 September 2008: see FSA Consultation Paper 09/1, 
Temporary Short Selling Measures. 
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prices overshooting in response to the signal that a share is overvalued.149 The legal 
nature of the prohibition and disclosure obligation.150 was that either the creation of a 
short position or failure to disclose an existing short position would constitute market 
abuse.151 While the prohibition was not renewed when it expired,152 the disclosure 
obligation was extended until June 2009 and then indefinitely.153 The Financial 
Services Act 2010 gives the FSA broader powers to make rules on short-selling, 
including restrictions based on financial stability grounds.154 At the EC level, a model 
for a pan-European short-selling disclosure regime has been proposed by the 
CESR.155 It differs from the UK disclosure model in that it has a lower (0.2%) 
threshold for disclosure of short positions in shares to regulators and a higher thresh-
old (0.5%) for public disclosure. Also relevant in this context is the change in 
regulatory style that is now evident in the UK in the wake of the financial crisis and 
in particular the greater willingness on the part of the FSA to take enforcement action 
over alleged infringements of the market abuse regime.156 
9. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
In contrast with the clear view expressed in relation to the causal role of regulatory 
failings associated with capital adequacy and financial stability, conduct of business 
regulation has not generally been viewed as a major causal factor in its own right.157 
                                                                                                                                               
149  Ibid., at p. 4. 
150  The disclosure obligation is triggered when a net short position (representing an economic 
interest in the issued share capital of an issuer) exceeds or falls below 0.25%, 0.35%, 0.45% and 
0.55% and each 0.1% threshold thereafter. Disclosure in this context means public disclosure, not 
just disclosure to the regulator. 
151  Market abuse is defined by s. 118 FSMA 2000, while s. 123 empowers the FSA to impose 
financial penalties for market abuse. In the case of authorised firms or their employees, other 
disciplinary measures may also be pursued by the FSA, such as the withdrawal of approval from 
‘approved persons’. 
152  On 16 January 2009. 
153  See FSA Consultation Paper 09/15, Extension of the Short Selling Disclosure Obligation 
(June 2009), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/CP/2009/09_15.shtml>. 
154  See section 8 of the Act. 
155  See CESR, Model for a Pan-European Short Selling Disclosure Regime, CESR/10-088. In 
the meantime, the temporary measures adopted by the German authorities illustrate the divergence 
of approach within the EU: see: <http://www.bafin.de/cln_179/nn_720486/SharedDocs/Artikel/ 
EN/Service/Meldungen/meldung__100518__cds__leerverkaufsverbot__allgemeinverfuegungen__ 
en.html?__nnn=true>. 
156  See J. Symington (Head of Wholesale Department, FSA), ‘The FSA and Enforcing the 
Market Abuse Regime’ (November 2008), at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communi 
cation/Speeches/2008/1106_js.shtml>, referring to credible deterrence and the role of criminal 
prosecutions; and ‘Seven Charged over Insider Trading Ring’, Financial Times, 31 March 2010. 
157  That is, considered separately from ‘light touch’ regulation and principles-based regulation, 
both of which carry direct implications for conduct of business regulation. 
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Conduct of business regulation received relatively little attention in either the Turner 
Review or the FSA Regulatory Response, albeit that both implied that in the past too 
much attention had been paid to conduct of business regulation by comparison with 
capital/liquidity regulation. Compared to the intense focus that emerged in the US on 
consumer protection (especially as regards mortgage origination and under-
writing.158), there was less focus on that issue in the UK, probably because the finan-
cial instruments most clearly implicated in the crisis were linked to US sub-prime 
mortgages.159 
The Turner Review commented that the FSA’s supervisory approach before the 
financial crisis, especially in the case of banking, resulted in ‘a balance between 
conduct of business regulation and prudential regulation which, with the benefit of 
hindsight, now appears biased towards the former’.160 This assessment reflects not 
only the recognised failures of the FSA in prudential supervision but also the sub-
stantial resources devoted by the FSA to its conduct of business initiatives in the 
retail market, in particular the Retail Distribution Review and the Treating Custom-
ers Fairly Initiative.161 While that assessment, combined with significant 
strengthening in the FSA’s staff engaged in prudential supervision,162 would suggest 
some downgrading of conduct of business regulation in terms of regulatory priorities, 
the recent analysis of retail conduct risks and issues in the FSA Financial Risk 
Outlook 2010 suggests that there remain important concerns.163 Pressure on banks as 
a result of recent losses and higher capital requirements are viewed as posing the risk 
that they may look to boost profits through unfair treatment of customers. Greater 
demand for capital-protected products in the wake of the volatility and fall in asset 
values witnessed in 2008 poses the risk of the development of complex products 
providing poor value without meeting customers’ needs. In the insurance sector, 
which attracts a large part of discretionary investment through unit-linked products, 
there are concerns over risks borne by the insurer and the customer respectively as 
well as over a reliance on commission-driven distribution networks. While most of 
the emerging conduct risks do not require to be addressed by legislative or regulatory 
changes, there is one significant change that carries long-term implications. Once the 
FSA’s Retail Distribution Review is implemented (from the end of 2012), it will no 
longer be possible for advisers to be paid a commission by the provider of retail 
                                                                                                                                               
158  See, e.g., Department of the Treasury, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation (June 2009), at: <http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/Final 
Report_web.pdf>, at p. 57. 
159  While the Turner Review found evidence of falling mortgage underwriting standards in the 
UK, mortgage defaults have not been a major source of losses for the UK banks and repossessions 
remain below the peak reached in the early 1990s recession. 
160  The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at p. 87. 
161  See further, Moloney, supra n. 137, chapter 4, part IV. 
162  See the Chief Executive’s report in the FSA 2008/09 Annual Report, noting a 34% rise in 
core supervisory staff. 
163  See The Turner Review, supra n. 7, at pp. 61-70. 
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investment products. This change reflects a long-standing concern of the FSA over 
the potentially distorting impact of commission-driven sales on consumer prefer-
ences and behaviour rather than a direct response to the financial crisis.164 
10. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Two aspects of corporate governance have been linked with the emergence of the 
financial crisis. One is the widespread failure on the part of boards of directors, and 
in particular independent non-executive directors, to understand and control the risks 
that were taken by their companies. Another is the role of inappropriate and exces-
sive forms of remuneration, which is closely linked with governance since one of the 
main concerns of governance codes is the setting of appropriate levels of remunera-
tion. 
10.1 The causal role of weak governance 
The causal role of weak corporate governance in the emergence of the crisis has been 
contested. In its initial analysis of the emerging crisis the FSA did not attribute a 
causal role to weak governance.165 but subsequently changed its position.166 The 
Turner Review recognised that ‘improvements in the effectiveness of internal risk 
management and firm governance are also essential’, but its main focus was on the 
causal role of poor design and operational failures in the prudential supervision of 
banks and other financial institutions. The Walker Review.167 commissioned by the 
Prime Minister in February 2009 was premised on there being a link between losses 
suffered by the UK banks and weak corporate governance. This link was accepted in 
the final report, which commented: 
It is not the purpose of this Review to assess the relative significance of the many 
different elements in the build-up to the recent crisis phase. But the fact that dif-
ferent banks operating in the same geography, in the same financial and market 
environment and under the same regulatory arrangements generated such mas-
sively different outcomes can only be fully explained in terms of differences in 
the way they were run. Within the regulatory framework that is set, how banks are 
run is a matter for their boards, that is, of corporate governance.168 
                                                                                                                                               
164  See further, Moloney, supra n. 137, chapter 4, part XI. 
165  See the causal factors cited in supra n. 6 (from the FSA Financial Risk Outlook 2009). 
166  See FSA Consultation Paper 10/3, supra n. 115, at p. 3: ‘Although poor governance was 
only one of many factors contributing to the crisis, it has widely been acknowledged to have been 
an important one.’ 
167  A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities 
(Walker Review) (July 2009), at: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm>. 
168  Ibid., at p. 5. 
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The Walker Review identified weaknesses in particular in the following areas: the 
expertise of non-executive directors; the linkage of pay with performance; and 
inadequate capability within major investing institutions to protect the interests of 
those for whom they act. Walker’s analysis of the role of corporate governance 
chimes with the approach adopted by the OECD.169 and some studies of earlier finan-
cial crises,170 but other commentators have disputed the causal role of weak 
governance. Adams, for example, has argued that it is not clear that ‘ex ante … 
boards of financial firms were doing anything much different from boards in other 
firms’.171 Similarly, she argues that the general perception of excessive pay in finan-
cial institutions is not borne out by the evidence once firm size is taken into account. 
On that basis, Adams concludes that the absence of a clear causal link between 
governance failure and the financial crisis should urge caution in reforming govern-
ance since there may be negative unintended side effects. Another study,172 which 
includes UK banks, found that the corporate governance quotient.173 of banks was not 
a good predictor of their financial performance during the financial crisis and that the 
financial strength as at the end of 2006 was a better indicator, especially as measured 
by capital ratios. More recently, Moody’s analysis of the corporate governance of 20 
large US and European banks pointed to the lack of any clear link between the 
performance of banks during the crisis and either the presence of independent direc-
tors on the board or their experience.174 While these studies may raise some doubts as 
to the global implications of weak governance, the stark divergence in performance 
between two cohorts of banks in the UK (a ‘bailout group’175 and a ‘stand-alone 
group’176) does tend to support the Walker Review conclusions in the UK context. 
Another factor that may be relevant is the limited capacity of measures of quality of 
                                                                                                                                               
169  See OECD, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’, Financial 
Trends No. 96 Vol. 2009/1, arguing: ‘The financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to 
failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements’ and noting weaknesses in 
corporate governance procedure that resulted in information about risk exposures failing to reach 
the Board and risk management being activity rather than enterprise-based. 
170  See, e.g., the analysis of the early 1990s Nordic banking crisis in D.G. Mayes, L. Halme 
and A. Liuksila, Improving Banking Supervision (Houndmills, Palgrave 2001), at p. 91. 
171  R. Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, at: <http:/ssrn.com/abstract_id= 
1398583>, at p. 15. The argument is based on evidence relating to governance characteristics (of 
US-listed companies) that apply equally to financial and non-financial firms, such as board 
independence, board size, amount and structure of pay. 
172  A. Beltratti and R.M. Stulz, ‘Why Did Some Banks Perform Better during the Credit Crisis? 
A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation’, at: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=1433502>. 
173  The quotient (often abbreviated to CGQ™) is a (unsolicited) rating of the corporate 
governance practices of major global companies (including UK FTSE All-Share constituents) by 
the RiskMetrics Group. 
174  See Lex Column ‘Banks Boards’, Financial Times, 25 March 2010. 
175  Comprising Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and Bank of Scotland. 
176  Comprising Barclays, HSBC and Standard Chartered. 
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corporate governance to capture the quality of management in the sense of making 
the right strategic decisions as opposed to following appropriate governance proce-
dures for making those decisions.177 In that sense, it might be said that no amount of 
good governance can compensate for bad judgment, albeit that good governance can 
limit the selection of directors with proven poor judgment or limit their influence 
within an organisation. 
With a view to improving the effectiveness of non-executive directors in financial 
institutions, the Walker Review recommended that more attention should be paid to 
ensuring that non-executive directors have the financial expertise to challenge the 
executive board as well as to meet the independence requirements of the Combined 
Code. Walker also stressed the need for greater board-level engagement in the moni-
toring of risk and in decisions on the entity’s risk appetite and tolerance. Specifically, 
he recommended the creation of a board risk committee and a chief risk officer, 
independent from business units, who should report to the committee and participate 
in risk management and oversight at the highest level on an enterprise-wide basis. 
10.2 Remuneration practices 
Walker’s engagement with remuneration in financial institutions represented an 
extension of concern over excessive and inappropriate remuneration that has been at 
the centre of the corporate governance debate in the UK in the last twenty years.178 
During that time, it has been addressed in various ways: in case of quoted companies, 
the Companies Act requires a directors’ remuneration report.179 each year on which 
shareholders have an advisory vote;180 the Companies Act also controls payments to 
directors for loss of office;181 the Combined Code requires that listed companies 
should delegate responsibility for setting remuneration for all executive directors to a 
remuneration committee comprising non-executive directors; and the Combined 
Code and ABI guidelines.182 set out guidance on the level and make-up of remunera-
tion. Yet, despite these multiple interventions, the financial crisis, and in particular 
state-sponsored bailouts, exposed ‘unsafe remuneration policies, which led to this 
                                                                                                                                               
177  See, e.g., B. Tricker, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2009), at pp. 35-36, 
distinguishing governance from management. 
178  For an overview of recent developments in the EC and at the international level, see G. 
Ferrarini and M.C. Ungureanu, ‘Executive Pay at Ailing Banks and beyond: A European 
Perspective’, 5 Capital Markets Law Journal (2010) pp. 197-217. 
179  Companies Act 2006, ss. 420-422. 
180  Ibid., s. 439. 
181  Ibid., s. 217. 
182  The ABI is the Association of British Insurers. Its guidelines represent the collective view 
of insurers as long-term shareholders. The ABI has a long-standing role in setting governance 
standards in the UK, along with the National Association of Pension Funds, the Association of 
Investment Companies and the Investment Management Association; collectively, these bodies 
comprise the Institutional Shareholders Committee. 
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calamitous state’.183 Walker stopped short of recommending any kind of cap on 
remuneration,184 opting instead for enhancement of disclosure.185 and expansion of the 
role of the remuneration committee ‘to cover all aspects of remuneration policy on a 
firm-wide basis with particular emphasis on the risk dimension’.186 
The Walker Review overlapped with the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) 
biennial review of the Combined Code and left the FRC with the problem of whether 
and how to integrate the Walker recommendations into the Combined Code. The 
view ultimately taken by the FRC was that the Code should remain unitary in its 
nature and not contain sector-specific provisions: thus, only those recommendations 
in the Walker Review that are applicable generally to listed companies will be in-
cluded in the Combined Code.187 However, a potentially significant development for 
investor engagement is that the FRC has accepted the Walker Review proposal that it 
should develop and take responsibility for a Stewardship Code that would effectively 
replace the Statement of Principles.188 formulated by the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee and the section of the Combined Code dealing with institutional share-
holders.189 In line with the prevailing approach under the Combined Code, 
compliance with the Stewardship Code on the part of asset managers will be on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis. The Walker Review regarded this approach as likely to 
provide a ‘quasi-official imprimatur’ for the Stewardship Code as well as oversight 
and review by the FRC in a manner similar to the Combined Code. 
While the FSA’s mandate does not directly encompass governance issues, there 
are inevitable overlaps between governance and regulation, especially in the context 
                                                                                                                                               
183  Walker Review, supra n. 167, at para. 7.1. 
184  Although this did not in itself preclude the government from using its power as controlling 
shareholder in bailed-out banks such as RBS and Lloyds/HBOS to implement some form of cap. 
185  The Financial Services Act 2010 (s. 4) implements Walker’s recommendation by 
authorising the Treasury to make regulations requiring (enhanced) disclosure of remuneration paid 
to executives of FSA-authorised firms. 
186  Walker Review, supra n. 167, Recommendation 29. 
187  See FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009), at: <http:// 
www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm>. Examples of generally applicable recommendations 
made by the Walker Review are amendment of the role of senior independent director 
(Recommendation 11) and board evaluation (Recommendations 12 and 13). The ‘rump’ of the 
Walker Review not taken into the Combined Code (or the Stewardship Code to be adopted by the 
FRC) is open to adoption by banks and financial institutions but it will not have the status of 
‘guidance’ under the Combined Code in the way that the Turnbull and Smith guidance do. The 
recommendations made in relation to remuneration have largely been subsumed into the FSA’s 
Remuneration Code. 
188  The Institutional Shareholders Committee, The Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles (updated June 2007), reproduced in Annex 8 of 
the Walker Review. 
189  See FRC, supra n. 187, at paras. 3.76-3.77. The FRC will consult separately on a 
Stewardship Code. 
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of the control of risk.190 The FSA viewed excessive and inappropriate remuneration 
as a ‘contributory factor rather than a dominant factor behind the financial crisis’ but 
nevertheless took the view that regulatory intervention in remuneration was justified 
as a means of promoting effective risk management and facilitating effective govern-
ance by shareholders. Its intervention took the form of changes to the Senior 
Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC) component of the FSA 
Handbook, requiring compliance with a new Remuneration Code that is also inserted 
into that component. The Code comprises a mixture of rules, guidance and evidential 
provisions,191 with the core obligation being that ‘a firm must establish, implement 
and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with 
and promote effective risk management’.192 
The use of guidance and evidential provisions limits the extent to which the Code 
is mandatory and aims to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ approach to remuneration. While 
the Code clearly does extend the FSA’s supervisory process into the field of remu-
neration,193 it remains to be seen what, if any, its effect will be. While the post-crisis 
environment provides a platform for greater regulatory and shareholder constraint 
over remuneration, the failure of a series of governance reforms in the past twenty 
years suggests considerable caution in the framing of expectations. So too does the 
perceived inability of the government as controlling shareholder to exercise signifi-
cant influence over remuneration (in the case of its controlling stakes in RBS and 
Lloyds/HBOS) since that policy may well be interpreted as a truer reflection of the 
realities of governance in financial firms, in contrast with the aspirational rhetoric of 
the FSA’s Code. 
11. CONCLUSION 
While it is difficult to attribute causality in connection with the financial crisis, there 
are a number of factors around which a consensus has emerged. Rapid credit expan-
sion without adequate growth in regulatory capital emerges as the primary factor, 
implicating both monetary policy and regulatory capability. In those areas where 
financial firms themselves were the primary movers, four issues stand out: first, poor 
                                                                                                                                               
190  For a general discussion, see I. MacNeil, ‘Risk Control Strategies: An Assessment in the 
Context of the Credit Crisis’, chapter 9 in MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., supra n. 24. 
191  An evidential provision is a type of rule that has evidential value in showing that another 
rule (such as the core obligation) has been breached or complied with. It is not in itself a binding 
rule since there may be other methods of compliance. 
192  FSA Handbook, SYSC (Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls), supra 
n. 65, at p. 19. 
193  Note also that the FSA announced in Consultation Paper 09/15, Reforming Remuneration 
Practices in Financial Services (August 2009), at p. 3, that it was incorporating remuneration risk 
into ARROW (the Advanced Risk Responsive Operating Framework) and other supervisory 
programmes. 
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risk management especially in regard to the implications of market disruption; 
second, pricing errors, especially in structured finance where reliance on flawed 
credit ratings proved to be particularly damaging; third, weak governance, evidenced 
by a lack of credible challenge to the strategic direction of some financial firms and 
poorly designed incentives; and finally, from the perspective of market structure and 
organisation, lack of transparency was an important factor. All these issues form an 
important part of the regulatory response in the UK and worldwide. 
There are several reasons why the progress of regulatory reform in the UK has 
been relatively slow, despite the severity of the crisis and its effect on the broader 
economy. One factor, which is evident in other countries also, is the need to agree 
international reform measures especially within the Basel Framework for banking 
supervision. The international nature of many banks and increasingly of the organ-
ised markets on which financial instruments are traded means that it is difficult for 
any individual country to become a first mover in implementing regulatory reform.194 
This observation is particularly relevant for the UK given its significance as a global 
financial centre. Second, the focus on crisis management, especially during 2009, 
drew attention away from regulatory reform to more immediate concerns over sur-
vival and re-shaping the financial sector through nationalisation, government 
guarantees and mergers. Third, considerable uncertainty has been caused by the 
timing of the UK Parliamentary election and political disagreement over the institu-
tional structure and style of regulation in the UK system. While the recent statement 
by the government regarding the institutional structure provides some certainty, 
much remains to be clarified in terms of the working of the system. Moreover, 
implementation of the EC proposals for new European-level bodies will complicate 
matters further. The only real certainty is that the institutional structure will be quite 
different once these changes have been made. 
The heavy emphasis in the regulatory reform debate and proposals on capital and 
liquidity threatens to mask other failings within the system. Conflicts of interest have 
attracted relatively little attention other than in the form of the high-level question as 
to whether investment banks (or a sub-set of their activity such as proprietary trad-
ing) should be separated from mainstream commercial banking. This limited focus 
tends to underplay the significance of conflicts of interest both within the legal 
structures that are created in connection with financing techniques (e.g., SIVs, con-
duits, limited partnerships) and the transactions through which these structures 
distribute financial instruments to investors. These conflicts of interest are the focus 
both of provisions of the FSA Handbook.195 and of common law fiduciary duties, 
which apply in many of the circumstances encountered in structuring and distributing 
                                                                                                                                               
194  Although the UK has shown itself willing to introduce a bank levy ahead of the US and the 
EU: see ‘UK Bank Levy’, Financial Times, 22 June 2010. 
195  A cursory search under ‘conflict of interest’ in the FSA Handbook reveals that there are in 
excess of 100 relevant provisions. 
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financial products. On the basis of the virtual absence of FSA enforcement action in 
this area it can only be concluded that there were no material breaches during the 
pre-2007 boom in securitisation and structured finance. This outcome leads to the 
conclusion that the crisis has generated a ‘compliance conundrum’ in which risk has 
materialised in an extreme form without triggering a significant set of (conflict of 
interest) rules intended to mitigate risk. There are in principle two explanations for 
such a conundrum. One is that the nature of the crisis genuinely did not implicate 
conflicts of interest in a material way: that is the implicit position of the FSA. The 
other is that the conundrum simply disguises the true position temporarily and that 
much more attention may be about to focus on this issue. The latter explanation finds 
some support in the so-called ‘Volcker rule’196 being discussed in the United States 
and recent moves by the SEC against Goldman Sachs.197 (viewed by some as just the 
beginning of a wave of litigation directed against the investment banks in particu-
lar.198). 
While it would be wrong to conclude that developments in litigation in the US 
will be matched on this side of the Atlantic, not least because of differences in the 
incentives and procedural rules associated with civil litigation, there are already 
some signs that private litigation is emerging in the UK in response to the crisis. 
There are a number of issues in particular that have already been the subject of 
litigation, such as: contractual capacity;199 customer classification;200 the legal status 
of ‘term sheets’ (which record the main terms of a transaction prior to completion of 
the full documentation);201 and ‘mis-selling’ claims based on common law and 
regulatory obligations.202 On the one hand, such private litigation can be viewed 
positively as a substitute for the absence of public enforcement by the FSA of func-
tional equivalents of private law duties in its rulebook which cover matters such as 
conflicts of interest and duties owed to clients. Viewed in that light, the threat of 
private litigation provides effective deterrence while the focus of regulatory rules is 
more on the systems and procedures that are established within authorised firms to 
protect clients.203 On the other hand, private litigation can be viewed as having a 
                                                                                                                                               
196  The proposed rule would prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading. 
197  See: <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.pdf>. 
198  See F. Partnoy, ‘Wall Street Beware: The Lawyers Are Coming’, Financial Times, 12 April 
2009. See also J. Bethel, A. Ferrell and G. Hu, ‘Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising 
from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis’, at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582>. 
199  See Haugesund Kommune, Narvik Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2009] EWHC 2227 
(Comm). 
200  See Spreadex Ltd v Sanjit Sekhon [2008] EWHC 1136 (Ch). 
201  See Maple Leaf Macro Volatility Master Fund v Rouvroy and Trylinski [2009] EWHC 257 
(Comm). 
202  See UBS v HSH Nordank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 585. 
203  However, earlier cases such as J.P. Morgan v Springwell Navigation [2008] EWHC 1186 
(Comm) suggest some caution over the degree of protection that the courts will be prepared to 
extend to clients. 
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potentially destabilising effect should inexperienced courts find themselves adjudi-
cating on market documentation and practices that they do not understand.204 This 
dilemma raises the broader issue of the extent to which conduct in financial markets 
escapes the scrutiny of courts applying general legal standards (such as fiduciary 
duty and associated conflict of interest rules) in favour of more specialist and tech-
nocratic control mechanisms mediated by regulators and private arbitration 
forums.205 
Also relevant in this context is a lack of analysis of the meaning of ‘market fail-
ure’ by reference to the private law rules that underpin the market. In the UK and 
elsewhere, regulatory agencies frequently make reference to ‘market failure’ as a 
basis for regulatory intervention but rarely is any attempt made to define what the 
concept means or to consider how it might be resolved through techniques other than 
regulatory intervention.206 In the light of the widespread perception of the failure of 
regulation during the recent crisis, this is perhaps a perverse outcome but it is never-
theless true. In particular, insufficient consideration is generally given to the 
potential for contractual and structural/organisational techniques to improve the 
working of markets in ways that would avoid the need for regulatory intervention.207 
There are probably two reasons for this. One is that market-based organisations.208 
that are responsible for contractual documentation and market practice operate 
independently from the regulators and are not directly subject to their jurisdiction. In 
that sense, the regulators’ mission is not to engage with the legal infrastructure of the 
markets but to intervene when it is seen to fail. This may well be an approach that 
has to change as the limited capacity of regulation to resolve ‘market failure’ be-
comes evident. Another relevant factor is that the way in which structural and 
organisational techniques are used in financial innovation.209 is by definition always 
changing and therefore the risks that they pose may not be well understood at any 
point in time. Thus, even in the case of a well-resourced regulator, there are inevita-
ble difficulties in attempting to determine whether particular techniques are 
inherently risky: it is much simpler to resort to regulatory techniques that measure 
and control risk by reference to financial thresholds even when it is known that this 
will lead to another round of innovation that seeks to circumvent the restrictions. 
                                                                                                                                               
204  See J.B. Golden, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: The Role of the Courts’, chapter 5, in 
MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., supra n. 24. 
205  See Partnoy, supra n. 198. 
206  See D. Rouch, ‘Self-regulation Is Dead: Long Live Self-Regulation’, 4 Law and Financial 
Markets Review (2010) pp. 102-122. 
207  The debate about the role of ‘clearing’ transactions through a central counterparty in 
stabilising markets is a relatively rare example of attempts to improve the market other than 
through regulation, albeit that regulation may ultimately mandate the use of clearing in some 
sectors such as derivatives. 
208  Such as LMA (London Market Association), ICMA (International Capital Markets 
Association) and ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association). 
209  Examples include the use of SIVs and complex trust structures in securitisation. 
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Both the crisis and the response to it are indicative of a complex relationship be-
tween governance and regulation. While there is some evidence to suggest that 
regulation may have been regarded as an adequate substitute for good governance 
prior to the crisis, it seems equally clear that much of the post-crisis process of 
holding individuals to account is being undertaken through governance mechanisms 
rather than regulatory processes. Thus, resignations from the board of directors, with 
varying degrees of encouragement from institutional investors, have been a more 
prominent feature post-crisis than regulatory action against individuals, albeit that 
there have been recent significant moves on that front by the FSA.210 The potential 
for governance to play a more substantial role in the future seems clear, especially 
since institutional investors with diversified portfolios have an obvious interest in the 
control of systemic risk, albeit that they face the same collective action problems in 
dealing with that issue as they do with other governance matters. 
Finally, it is clear that the new focus on financial stability will be the key factor in 
the development of the UK system in the years ahead. While the definition of what 
that means and the development of macro-prudential techniques to implement policy 
are important issues that await clarification, it should not be forgotten that there are 
also broader policy issues that must come into play. Thus, as the Bank of England 
has recently argued, macro-prudential policy must be set within a framework in 
which societal preferences for stability over growth are debated and implemented 
within an appropriate accountability framework.211 This poses a challenge for gov-
ernment both at the level of principle and in terms of linking financial regulation 
with other aspects of government policy, but it is an issue that cannot be avoided if 
financial stability is to form a solid basis for regulatory policy in the years ahead. 
                                                                                                                                               
210  See, e.g., ‘Ex-RBS Director Agrees to FSA Ban’, Financial Times, 18 May 2010. 
211  See Bank of England, supra n. 68, at p. 29. 
